Ah I see, the OP is saying that it isn't in code. Guess we'll have to wait for public comment. I dont have the tech chops to verify either way, nor do I have any direct contact with anyone from Ashigaru.
but isn't that wording kind of weird?
we're not concerned with the keys being sent to the client... we're concerned the *coordinator being able to link inputs/output, not the clients.
it seems like theyre addressing a different issue there.
Ah I see, the OP is saying that it isn't in code. Guess we'll have to wait for public comment. I dont have the tech chops to verify either way, nor do I have any direct contact with anyone from Ashigaru.
its not a vulnerability if they're modulating the hardcoded key per CJ round correct?
as @waxwing suggested on original vulnerability disclosure post Jan 7th?
either way, the server CANNOT give clients a unique key for identification.
afaict its false because they have hardcoded a key into the client.
therefore the server cant assign different RSA keys to different clients to map their inputs/outputs.
fd0 was premature in thinking the vulnerability hasnt been addressed.
this guy only repeats stuff that fits his bias, without understanding them himself.
nobody has had time to thoroughly review Ashigarus Whirlpool implementation yet.
so far it's clear they have done some work to fix that vulnerability.
Cyph3rp9nk
New ashigaru whirlpool coordinator can de-anonymize users
And now, if the coordinator signs outputs with the same static blind key in all rounds, an attacker can accumulate those signatures and redeem them later to register additional outputs without contributing new inputs. It does not allow them to steal funds, but it breaks the round balances and causes it to fail, blocking all other participants (DoS).
And on top of that, they don't mitigate the vulnerability they've tried to remedy with this crap...
If they were at least humble, they would get help...
View quoted note →
Can the Ashigaru Whirlpool coordinator de-anonymize users?
I don't know but what I can say is that developing a trustless protocol/service is extremely hard, especially when your starting point is a trustful one.
Whirlpool is a ZeroLink implementation similar to Wasabi Wallet 1.x was and even when the protocol and the cryptography involved are simple, there are many chances to make mistakes. During the early days Wasabi team introduced bugs using RSA and then using Schnorr, for example.
This is something to celebrate anyway as we need more privacy tools and because it was sad to witness the level of cowardy raining in the environment while a bunch of "purists" attacked all privacy tools as if they were able to do it better.
At your feet, @lontivero .
I feel a great sadness witnessing developers and users spending their valuable energy pointing out flaws, while very little is directed towards reconizing the effort and goals of #Ashigaru (that are also ours as user community). Thank you once again for dedicating your valuable time to reply and provide context to this uproar.