> users trust information isn't being recorded and shared
Even if routing nodes collude they cannot identify the sender or the recipient
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@Hanshan, do you have evidence that this isn't true ?
if your threat model is a global passive adversary they clearly know where payments begin and end.
his (unexpressed) point is "the second and second-to-last nodes on a route can't be sure they are second and 2nd to last"
but it totally depends on the level of collusion between large nodes. a global passive adversary isn't required, if enough large nodes (particularly in a hub-and-spoke design) collude they can have *reasonable certainty* where payments originate and end up.
Add mapping via channel probing and consider.
not saying it happening now,
but I AM saying,if it was happening you wouldn't know.
which is why we have L1 systems designed to function in the open.
That is the advantage of using a blockchain and not an L2.
everything is tradeoffs.