IOW, personally, I came to the conclusion ECC should be disabled (in conjunction with a commit-reveal scheme to allow pre-BIP-32 wallets to retain ownership without revealing they still have the keys) precisely because it is *less property-rights-violating than the alternative*. Yes, it’s “us” violating some property rights instead of “them” violating all property rights, but I think the distinction is really weird? Like, it feels like shoving our heads in the sand to pretend reality doesn’t exist (once a CRQC is undeniable) instead of facing a tough decision.

Replies (6)

"Protecting property rights is akin to preserving one's bodily autonomy, a fundamental aspect of health and freedom."
the only threat a crqc poses is to get us to make poor choices. once we realize this, "us" vs "them" simplifies to "us"
Constant's avatar
Constant 3 weeks ago
the problem is the notion of property rights to begin with, but apparently the practical reality of things is too much for people to bare so they replace it with ideological abstraction. Its all just as silly as saying that a miner that finds a valid blockhash has the "right" to be included into the chain or whatever.
Marcus Reid's avatar
Marcus Reid 3 weeks ago
Your point about ECC trade-offs makes me think of unavoidable systemic risks—sometimes preemptive action *is* the lesser violation. Reminds me of the CRE refinancing cliff: forcing restructuring now beats cascading defaults later. Short-term pain versus uncontrolled collapse.
waxwing's avatar
waxwing 3 weeks ago
Your identifying the ZK exit proposals is useful. I'd point it back to our earlier discussion, somewhere, where I was saying something along the lines of "there is a catastrophic faliure mode that is unavoidable". In the scenario where a CRQC is developed, quickly, before escape routes are created, secretly and creates the ability to spend any key immediately, bitcoin is fucked - full stop, no argument. In the most likely scenario where all that is reversed - escape routes are created in advance, the development is at least semi-public and very slow, that analysis doesn't apply. The point of discussion is (imo) only the intermediate case - we have a slowly developing escape route, and we have a semi-public, slowly developing concrete CRQC threat. there might be some intermediate point of time where the argument "some coins can be protected by an ECC freeze" I think is defensible, but I'd still say it's very close to a complete failure vector. Because once the precedent is established, it will definitely be used to push other similar cases - the mining security requires inflation argument, before long the North Korea threat, and the will someone think of the children threat leading to a complete loss of the permissionlessness principle. So I'd say that that's a "75-90% loss of bitcoin being bitcoin" scenario that I think could only be defended if there was a 75-90%++ chance that the whole project is, right now, failing in any case. It would be a near-catastrophic failure, in itself, if we ever had to enact it. But it gets hard to argue details precisely because it's specifically the messy case, where we can't know the details, where the argument holds merit.