as an amateur cryptographer, this anti-nip-04 thing is completely nonsensical
chacha-poly-1080 in not stronger than AES 256 ... what is it CBC? ... no, AEAD... with no actual extra data btw, so it was pointless making it that anyway
the giftwrapping enables some degree of forward privacy but it also makes it complicated for clients to see messages the user wrote, and i notice this all the time clients are not seeing the messages
after making my relay really nice and easy to extend and work with one of my first priorities is making messaging work properly
like, seriously, do people not get it the reason why i am always talking about nip-42 auth all the time is so you can prevent access to these messages in the first place?
the right way to do things is to test and certify that relays are not allowing access to events they don't have proof of being in the conversation
it also applies to application specific data events too, which are encrypted, by some clients, but not by others (looking at you #nostrudel )
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seriously, has anyone actually thought through the problem of implementing clients to pull messages that contain no reference to a user without leaving them wide open for anyone to read?
first rule of signals intelligence is don't send a signal you don't want to be noticed for its mere existence, or at worst, exposing you to a potential plaintext attack if the encryption has a flaw
i honestly don't think that anyone else in nostr dev really understands the problems they are trying to solve with nip-04, nip-44, and the rest
The main issue is that nip-04 leaks way too much data not only to the relay, but to the public in general. On top of that, the encryption procedures of NIP-04 are laughable. The lack of padding alone is a major problem. Imagine saying "Hi" on a DM and that gets converted to 4 encrypted chars. Besides letting everyone know your message is small, how hard is to break the encryption of a 4 char cipher text? Not that hard.
If you repeat GMs around, now you have 100s or 1000s of 4 char encrypted messages. How hard would it be to recover your shared key knowing all those little messages? Not that hard.
With enough shared keys, how hard would it be to figure out somebody's nsec? It gets in the realm of "possible" with today's available computing power.
