I like the seed XOR feature. What do you think makes it the "worse end of HWW security" and what do you think is better?

Replies (5)

That feature is basically the same as 2-of-2 or passphrases, and the problems with 2-of-2 have been pretty well documented by now. I did my own research and architecturally it is significantly flawed. There are many weak points where you could be getting a backdoored device. The used secure elements are weak and outdated. “Don’t trust, verify” goes much deeper than reading some marketing claims about “ultra secure” from the vendor and I see too many people falling for it. New Trezor for example is “quantum ready” but any device within the last 15 years is as well. Personally I’d recommend something like a SeedSigner with a proper multisig and a BitBox maybe.
I use a geographically distributed 3-of-5 multisig + seed XOR and Smanir Secret Sharing as a secondary backup in case the banks get shut down again. During lockdown, I couldn't access my Trezor for 3 months and that made me re-evaluate everything. I agree that seed XOR together is a bad idea. I'm currently playing with time locks using Miniscript, but only with small amounts so far because I'm not 100% confortable with it yet.
They prefer to write articles about why airgaps aren't as useful as we think. Stinks of "filters don't do anything." Airgaps aren't a be all and end all. But they are one element of a solid security strategy, and writing it off is exactly why I'm not a Bitbox customer.