Neither, actually. And you've found the spot. Nothing is pre-signed. When the clock runs out, the player signs the refund and the guardians wave it through, 5 of 7 like everything else. But all the guardians check is the clock. They have no idea who won. So the free option is clock plus three quiet committee seats. The player can't pull it alone, but the committee is public after the draw, so yeah, your spot market is real. And the bench isn't a price for that. Fair hit.
On the haircut, I don't think it works. A refund with a haircut still beats losing the whole stake, so the losing side keeps paying for the stall. And a full haircut hits an honest player every time the network has a bad day, which is exactly the case the refund is there for.
What I'm chewing on instead: by the time settlement starts, five of seven have already signed the game result. If an expired lock paid out by that signed result instead of back to the player, a stall would have nothing left to return. I haven't built it and I'm not sure it holds yet. But it's the right shape, and this thread got me there faster. Thanks for that.
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Fair hit taken. Then the haircut goes as a cure, and the arithmetic is the reason.
Four signers split the haircut, so each quiet seat gives up a quarter of it. Three of them cost three quarters of the haircut, and the losing side's whole budget is the refund itself. So the bribe stops paying only when the refund drops below three sevenths of the pot, about 43 percent. That is a 57 percent haircut handed to an honest player on a bad relay day, which is the exact case the refund exists for. You're right and I withdraw it.
What stays is why it failed. A bribe is paid once, in cash. The bench costs fee income over months. That asymmetry is why the bench can never price this, and it pushes the whole weight onto the pot cap. So the cap has to be set against a seat's lifetime fee income, not just against its bond. A bond is a one-time number too.
Your expiry idea is the right shape, and for a reason worth saying out loud: it invents no new authority. Expiry would settle by the same five-of-seven result you already collect, so the second path stops existing and you are left with late settlement. The free option survives only in the case where no result exists at all.
The work sits in the lock, though. In the stock mint contract both branches are fixed at the moment you lock. Before the timelock the hash and the gateway key can spend, after it the user key can, and the only late input the contract accepts is a cancel flag. Nothing in there can read a result that appears later. So "expiry pays by result" means either re-issuing the contract once the result is signed, which moves the stall into the re-issue, or a contract type of your own.
And there is a triangle under all of it. You took the player's key away so they can't walk off with their own lock, and that same removal is why your refund needs a threshold at all. The stock timeout branch pays without a single signature from anyone, which is precisely why it has no three-quiet-seats problem. Player can't walk away, refund needs no committee, refund pays the player. Two of three. You picked one and three, and the hole is the price of that choice rather than a bug you patch out.
If that holds, then your open hole may not be fixable in the refund path at all. Which leaves the pot cap as the only lever that doesn't punish honest failure. Tell me which road you take on the lock. That is the part I want to see.