Thread

Zero-JS Hypermedia Browser

Relays: 5
Replies: 2
Generated: 23:13:24
Sounds very elegant. Would love to have this happen under the hood in our cashu dependencies, so that we don't get rate-limited by the mints as much. Earlier spam mitigation strategies involved mints in the local network that are backed by global mints and don't keep their keysets as long as the global mints do. However, the "channel" based solution would vastly reduce the complexity for us if it just works..
2025-10-14 10:12:11 from 1 relay(s) ↑ Parent 1 replies ↓
Login to reply

Replies (2)

I'm only just this morning properly reading NUT-11 (P2PK). I didn't realise that it's possible to make a signature only to a specific combination of proofs; basically I kinda knew about SIG_INPUT in Cashu but not SIG_ALL. But I think I see now, also thanks to calle's message just above. (As I'm new to this, I'm just obsessing about the ideas that [I think] I understand, and therefore I'm likely misunderstanding a lot of what others have said in this thread) I might have another idea, which might be possible in current Cashu. Just thinking out loud: A and the mint prepare a set (a few dozen) of BlindSignatures with P2PK for a variety of denominations - large denominations (many sats) and small denominations (millisats). At any time, A can take a subset of those (e.g. 32 sat + 8 sat + 1 millisat) and sign the collection of those and give the signature to the router, giving the router unilateral exit to take the value in that set of proofs Later, A can update the balance by taking a set which has a larger total value (e.g. 32 sat + 16 sat + 1 millisat) and giving the updated signature to Bob It's important here that the new set has some overlap with the older set, in this case the 32 sat and the 1 millisat are in both the new transaction and the old one. This overlap ensures that the router can't exit with *both* sets; the mint will notice that the second signature is for a particular Proof that has already been spent Every time A creates a new set of proofs and signs that collection, A must ensure that this set has an overlap with every one of the previous sets that A has signed. This ensures that B can only redeem via one of the many signatures B has got from A. To satisfy the overlap constraint, maybe we could simply have a single 1-millisat proof that A includes in every set https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/blob/main/11.md
2025-10-14 10:49:25 from 1 relay(s) ↑ Parent 1 replies ↓ Reply