GrapheneOS has diminished exploit capabilities for Cellebrite a third time. They are no longer able to Full Filesystem extraction an unlocked device. This prevents extraction of hidden operating system and application data. Given it is unlocked, they're still accessing all the important stuff though.
This could be an indicator of their target. They are likely to move their resources to attempt researching an exploit targeting the Titan M2 secure element or for extraction for AFU Locked devices rather than be concerned about extracting a device already unlocked.
We routinely receive this information from sources familiar with Cellebrite. However, do you have more information on exploit vendors? Do the right thing. Tip off #GrapheneOS at security@ our domain or contact the project account on our platforms. We will respect your privacy. We have made upstream security reports to Google and Apple.
Encryption can be performed via our Age public key:
age1dcftzgq00ykgwvxl5te6d5clqgx75h2g54c0u8gjc43mcnea7p7q3ma0yx
https://grapheneos.org/.well-known/security.txt
Cellebrite leak highlights how much more secure Pixel phones are with GrapheneOS
https://www.androidauthority.com/cellebrite-leak-google-pixel-grapheneos-security-3611794/
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