GM I think there are two different points here. The first is about cryptographic proofs and whether they can be assumed to be solid. I absolutely think we should have a discussion about the Bulletproofs that ensure Monero supply and how well they've been vetted and whether that is sufficient. But maybe that's not the main gist of your point. so let's talk about the second one, I think the point you bring up is actually about information theory and "unknown unknowns." we can never be sure holes don't exist. and having a larger attack surface means there are more places for those unknown holes to be. thats absolutely correct. this is true on every situation and system we encounter in our lives. as a Bitcoin example, we *don't know that there's NOT some exploit where I could spend Satoshi's coins. but because the attack service is relatively small, there is large incentive to attack it and theres been some time now, everybody assumes that this is impossible and there aren't any "unknown unknowns" in that system anymore. this seems reasonable. in that same way everywhere, once the attack surface is known and it's generally accepted that no "unknown unknowns" exist, we assume a system to be solid and sound. are we ever 100% confident that there are no unknown unknowns? No. we cannot prove the *non-existence* of something. so the question then becomes, how much assurance is enough? this also applies to cryptographic proofs that ensure supply. once the attack surface is known and we've been over it and it's been tested and tested, how much assurance is enough? So the point of this rant I'm on recently is just to say " there IS a point where there's enough assurance and we can have confidence in this system." this isn't particularly radical, we do this all the time with everything. at a certain point we just say" it's verified enough" and start using the damn thing. what is strange and weird is for maxis to say that NO assurance is EVER enough vis-a-vis supply verification and ONLY supply verification.