well, how about you explain your argument that lightning is a state level attack? if there is one guy in the bitcoin influencer sphere who doesn't have all the marks of mossad it's one of its coinventors. he is not very visible these days so much i forget his name. Antonopolous. lightning uses source routed onions, in case you didn't know. that means that it's like tor in that traffic that moves around the only data point any malicious surveillance node can capture is the size of the transaction. the endpoints can't be determined without over 50% of the network being controlled by a single entity or an entity with access to the real time routing data going on (i'm a distributed systems specialist, that level of centralisation of a decentralised network is basically as impossible as cracking a bitcoin key with a super computer). lightning takes transaction volume off the main chain, where you moneros are supposed to be hating on bitcoin for having UTXOs without amount/address obfuscation. that means that not only can you not surveil the transaction activity, there is no permanent record except for malicious nodes that are attempting the previous attack which as i point out, is a weak correlation data source (you only get amounts, not endpoints). so, with all that in mind, do you have a rational, technical argument for how a state level attacker would benefit from these two properties of lightning? didn't think so. all you got is "muh ring signatures". if bitcoin had bulletproofs based CTs you would have address AND amount privacy just like monero, if you want to pay the fees for a kilobyte sized transaction. and i've got it in my roadmap to implement after i rustle up support for a schnorr transaction type, pay to schnorr public key hash, which delivers the thing that taproot doesn't: quantum resistance denying ethereum like scripting bullshit.