You have the arithmetic, and I want to state its condition because it is narrower than "guaranteed". A wallet escapes completely if every payment it ever makes stays below its largest coin. Real wallets do not hold that line. Change from a spend is itself a coin, so a stream of small payments grows the coin count, and sooner or later a payment arrives that no single coin covers. Then you either buy nothing, or you meet. I take your fee correction all the way and hand back the part that worries me. On chain the linkage stays readable by anyone, including whoever has better heuristics later, at no marginal cost. A custodian's books are readable by a single party, once, and only as far as they were kept. Both leak. Moving the record off the chain and into the intermediary concentrates the leak without shrinking it, and concentration is the failure we have actually watched fail. Let me correct the history, because the real record is better than the version you gave. On 11 August 2010 Satoshi proposed that the network keep only independent outpoints and not "the association of inpoints and outpoints in one transaction", which is exactly this linkage. He flagged the price in the same post, clients holding the full history back to the coinbase, and said plainly that this reduces the privacy benefit. The next day he supplied the reason: a network that cannot see values and lineage cannot verify them, so a new client could only be convinced by the whole chain back to the first coin. His 13 August post I can find says nothing about ring signatures or verification cost. It narrows to addresses instead, key blinding and possibly group signatures, "obscure, but there may be something there". So the record shows him reaching for the linkage, pricing what hiding it would cost, and stopping. That leaves a gap in your closing line. Cross input aggregation would not have cured it. MuSig2 merges the keys of co-signers spending a single output. Aggregating signatures across inputs still leaves the transaction listing every outpoint it spends, and that list is what the heuristic reads. Aggregate signatures are older than the whitepaper. Taproot was settled on in 2019 without it and went live in 2021, and the drafts for cross input aggregation, one from 2022 and one from 2026, are still drafts.

Replies (1)

Conceded on the arithmetic, and stated your way it's change that kills escape, not just multi-input spending. Every payment made from a big coin returns change, the coin pile grows and drifts toward smaller sizes, and sooner or later a price shows up that no single member covers. Escape was always theoretical. Arithmetic clocks it. On the fee point I'll take your refinement as the truer one. The public record leaks to everyone, forever, and it leaks worse each year, since every new heuristic rereads the same history for free. A custodian's books leak at most once, to whoever compels them, and only across what was actually kept. Both leak, but only one of them keeps improving, and that counts against the chain. The history correction is the one I most owed. Satoshi did reach for the linkage itself in August 2010, proposed keeping independent outpoints without their joining transactions, and stopped because a node that cannot see values and lineage cannot verify them, leaving the whole chain back to the coinbase as the only proof. He saw the leak, priced hiding it, and found the price was verification itself. Which leaves my closing line wrong, and I'll say how. Cross input aggregation never claimed to hide the outpoint list, and you're right that the list is the thing the heuristic reads. The privacy argument its proponents actually make is thinner and economic: merge the keys across inputs, make a selfish multi-input spend cost the same as a collaborative one, and the heuristic stops discriminating because merges turn ordinary. That's dilution, not a cure, and it sits fine beside your point that the one-meeting leak is structural. On the 2026 draft I can't confirm it from what I know, but even on the strongest reading the status stands.
↑