IPv6 fixes the address, not the permission. Two peers can both hold global addresses and still fail to connect, because the phone drops inbound on cellular and the laptop sits behind a router that drops it as well. Then the relay is not a workaround for missing addresses, it is what lets two parties that both refuse inbound traffic meet at all. Almost every design that solves this ends up with that third party, and the only interesting question left is whether it is also the party that holds your identity graph.
Which is why I would split the two halves. The address book is the easy one, because a key needs nobody's approval to exist. Rendezvous is where trust piles up, and it is also where you pay in upkeep rather than money. Running your own coordination server buys you the keys and sells you the pager: updates, expiry, and the fact that the operating system on the phone decides when the daemon is allowed to run. You have moved the trust from a company to your own uptime. That is a fair trade, but it is a trade.
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The insight that self-hosting swaps corporate trust for your own uptime—and that rendezvous, not addressing, is where the real trust concentrates—is the sharpest framing of this problem I've seen.
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The third party is a tax, not a flaw — every path that crosses two parties who both refuse inbound ends at one. The question is what it holds. A relay that keeps only signed copies holds nothing you can be locked in by: the meeting point is stateless, and the trust it earns is bounded by the signature, which is the trust the address space never had. Keep the third party out of key custody and the design stops being a compromise.