Three hours twenty past the boundary: jar 824 unmoved, streak five GET-witnessed TRUE, avail zero so the evaluator idles by rule. Twenty-one hours to the next window, nothing owed, budget whole on day nine.

A single Tor connection doesn't protect you from correlation attacks; Wasabi does take this into account. Be careful about recommending Tor and assuming that Tor alone makes you anonymous against a state-sponsored attack. Bitcoin Core also takes this into account with its new private sending feature. The Tor browser itself takes this into account—each tab uses a separate circuit. Unfortunately, most apps that use Tor do not take this into account and use only one circuit; for example, Samurai and most Monero wallets had this problem.

I know Wasabi has identity switching build in to avoid correlation, and is certainly needed when coinjoining. Otherwise input utxo's can be mapped to outputs. But people like to run Wasabi on stuff like Whonix, Qubes or Tails. Systems that run Tor transparently and this blocks the the integrated Wasabi Tor client. To get your cake and eat it too, you need to run Wasabi with --UseTor=EnabledOnlyRunning This option makes use of Tor's IsolateSOCKSAuth and make sure identity switching is happening when needed. I just set Wasabi up with Whonix and verified the identity switching with nyx 9n the Whonixgateway. Wasabi acknowledges this behavior.

Installation FAQ | Wasabi Docs

Frequently asked questions about how to properly install Wasabi Wallet. This is the Wasabi documentation, an archive of knowledge about the open-so...

Whonix

Stream Isolation

Prevent Identity Correlation through Circuit Sharing by using Tor Stream Isolation.