If youβre using a signing device (hardware wallet) you already have two things: the signing device itself, and some other software wallet.
It is not a big lift to upgrade to 2-of-2 multisig where one is the device and the other is your software wallet.
But this simple set up protects you from any single vendor bug. #Bitcoin
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Multisig won't save you from CBDCs and Klaus Schwab's surveillance state.
This is terrible fucking advice. π€¦ββοΈ
One should NEVER introduce a single point of failure; lose one key & they're fucked. π«
There should always be at least one contingency key so users don't risk locking themselves out of their own funds. πββοΈ
Best multisig practice is:
1. X-of-Y
2. X < Y
3. X & Y are odd
4. X is a majority
Examples (and example use cases):
2-of-3 (single user grade; single contingency)
3-of-5 (small-medium business grade; double contingency)
5-of-7 (institutional grade; double contingency)
5-of-9 (institutional board voting; quadruple contingency)
7-of-9 (institutional high security; double contingency)
7-of-11 (institutional high security; quadruple contingency)
9-of-11 (nation-state security; double contingency)
All of these introduce increased security without introducing single points of failure that could risk fund lockup from lost keys. π
Be a good sherpa. π€