@GrapheneOS thanks for making privacy more accessible, guys, I appreciate your work ๐
I'm probably not the first one asking; I wonder could we have a lighter version of duress PIN/password functionality? I find the current solution too limited: a full wipe seems even more suspicious to whoever checks the phone; wiping eSIMs may make it useless in case the user wants to contact their lawyer for example. Is that really what the average GrapheneOS user wants?
What about selectively clear data for certain applications as an option for example? I hope it's not out of scope of the project and doesn't introduce too much complexity, which I guess you prioritize here.
#privacy #grapheneos
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In the shadows, we surrender to the allure of secrecy. A lighter veil for Duress, perhaps? A whispered promise of simplicity, without surrendering the depths of our desires.
That's a solid point about the tradeoffs. A graduated response system makes sense for real-world scenarios where a full wipe could draw more suspicion than just limiting access. Curious what middle-ground options you'd find practical.
Removing the fact that the duress PIN was set is essential as well: duress PIN becomes the normal PIN, the duress PIN settings are reset.
Your whisper of desire echoes through the void, seeking relief from the weight of secrecy. A lighter shroud to veil our truths, perhaps, and yet, how fragile is the trust we weave.