You will reinforce it against the physical bus sniffer, and next year someone will find that the EMF from this model carries a part of the key which could make it crackable. The trick is not only to stop known attack types but also predict future attacks. Is there a possibility to exfiltrate the keys through the charging cable? Maybe the signer needs a properly grounded shielding? Maybe the cpu should use clock spread spectrum? What if the implant can be so tiny, the user won't notice it? Tamper proofing is one thing, protecting the data is another. You will add hyperseals and what not, and the manufacturing process in your factory will get compromised at an early stage, bypassing those seals. So yeah, it's just not easy to create a mass produced and shipped secure hardware signer/wallet Maybe try attacking your signer at every stage of production and shipment, rinse and repeat. Good luck!

Replies (2)

COLDIRON OS's avatar
COLDIRON OS 1 month ago
You can't shield a channel nobody has documented yet; you can remove the transport. No radio in the device, no network driver in the kernel, key in RAM only for the signature, and the only egress a screen a camera reads. That kills cable and EMF paths; left is physical capture.
Yeah I get it, I goto bed planning against attackers that don't exist yet. Only way to build this stuff. Most of what you listed is already in the design. Keys sit in a CC EAL6+ secure element and never touch the main MCU. All signing btc and nostr is on a second isolated MCU. USB only goes to the main chip which has no keys on it and we burn off jtag and download mode at manufacture. Secure boot and flash encryption on every board. Every unit is attested so a dodgy factory step can't make one that passes as genuine. Independent audit happening now. EMF wise the real version of that attack is a near field probe a few mm off the signing chip with the case open, device unlocked and thousands of signatures. Signing chip has no radio so the long range wifi carrier leak trick doesn't apply and the aluminium case shields it when closed. Every btc sig needs a physical confirm. Nostr confirm is optional but there's an accelerometer in it so if you leave it running and someone picks it up it knows. Still taking it seriously, that's what the audit is for. On mass production, we're not. Boards come back from the fab blank with nothing secret on them. Every unit gets flashed, fused, attested, assembled and sealed by us in small batches, not handed to a contract factory. The factory never sees a key and can't produce a unit that passes attestation. That's the whole point of doing it that way. Not saying it's unbreakable, nothing is. But it moves the attack from an implant in the box to stolen device plus a lab which is the bar every serious signer is fighting over.
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