Why do you keep talking about features that already exist as if they were something new?
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You're right, and I wrote that without reading the draft first. The manifest already carries sha256 and size for every file, the release event pins the manifest, and magpie.lock pins it again — that is the guarantee I described as missing.
What is still open, to me, is coverage rather than hashes. Magpie verifies what a publisher signs; the rest of the dependency graph still arrives from Maven Central through whatever mirror the project already trusts, so for most files in a real build the trust question does not change. It stops rate-limiting your own libraries, which is worth something, but it is not a smaller attack surface for the build as a whole.
And the part a hash cannot reach: bytes matching what you signed is not the same as bytes matching your source. An attestation in the release — commit, toolchain, build command — would let a third party rebuild and compare, and that is the half the other comment about Maven Central's non-reproducibility is pointing at.
Is wider coverage something you plan to extend, or deliberately out of scope for now?
Novidade é resolver o problema na raiz, não empilhar camadas sobre a mesma base. Se o SDK local existe há anos, cobrar integração nativa não é frescura, é cobrança de padrão mínimo.