Peter Alexander's avatar
Peter Alexander
npub1yy3u...kawc
China 30 year veteran Joined Nostr at block 777177
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 yesterday
Here is a perfect example of why you need to tread carefully anytime there’s a flurry of commentary discussing China. Be it Beijing’s motivations, or the supposed fact that – somehow – action taken by the United States in the Middle East has provided for escalatory leverage. It may sound like a cliche, but you must know that the Chinese are playing multiple steps ahead of Washington. Perhaps some unsolicited advice. The next time you stumble across an individual weighing in on the China debate, simply ask that individual when was the last time they were in country. It’s all noise when it comes to the arm chair macro tourists and armchair geopolitical theorists. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/china-tells-top-refiners-to-suspend-diesel-and-gasoline-exports
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 yesterday
China Morning Missive More of the Same, as Expected That time of year again, the China “Two Sessions” where Beijing leadership lays out its economic plans for the coming year. Much as expected, the path forward is essentially the very same path from 2025. Where I’m focused is on the continued deleveraging especially at the local government level. Basically, it is a “left pocket, right pocket” strategy where Beijing is issuing so called ultra-long special sovereign bonds and will use those proceeds to retire local government debt. There’s been no fiscal bazooka and there will be no fiscal bazooka. There will be no direct support provided to households. Once again, I will state emphatically that Keynes is well and truly dead in China. The lessons of 2008 were learned and policy was thusly adjusted. What this will also mean is continued deflationary pressure. My ongoing thesis remains intact as well. Beginning in 2017, but in earnest staring in 2020, Beijing shifted to an entirely new economic model. Property and infrastructure, the historic drivers of growth, were to be phased out and replaced by manufacturing, or more specifically what’s referred to as the fourth industrial revolution. There’s no question that what Beijing is seeking to achieve is a very big ask. There is no guarantee that the strategy will ultimately work. The economic structural issues were, however, recognized and a path forward was created to address those issues. That’s far more than can be said of any G7 nation-state. If, and this is a very big if, China does prove successful in the transition it’ll be game over. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/china-s-steady-debt-plan-calms-bond-market-on-ample-liquidity
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 2 days ago
It is hard to fathom that non-action by the Beijing leadership is somehow being viewed as a net geopolitical gain for the United States. The cultural divide is truly a chasm. image
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 3 days ago
On the off chance some of you missed it, Chancellor Merz lost it after his trip to China last week.
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 3 days ago
China Morning Missive “A Single Flower does not Make a Spring” There seems to be a rather weak theory going around that America has deployed some grand plan to systematically cut China off from key strategic partners. While there are certainly more than a few dots which can be connected to reach such a conclusion, it remains an errant conclusion and, if anything, only goes to demonstrate just how poorly China’s 30 years of foreign policy strategies are understood throughout the Beltway. To begin, the theory being promulgated is an act of pure projection. How American policy has been conducted over the past 30 years must, obviously, be the very same course of action under consideration by the leadership in Beijing. Not even close and it is rather obvious, at least to me, that few have read BGen Samuel Griffith’s book on Sun Tzu. To the Americans, the world is built upon alliances and a Judeo-Christian ethos that delineates between good actors and bad actors. It is all a very black and white mindset and extremely rigid. It is also an approach which is highly antithetical to how Beijing operates. What continues to evade much of Washington, the Beltway consensus and the entire Thing Tank Senior Fellow ecosystem is a foreign policy construct which has been built around a web of counterparties, not formal alliances. Counterparties which are centered on commercial interests and, critically, are meant to achieve the specific strategic aim of optionality through the redundancies of critical inputs. In the case of the Middle East, even the most tertiary assessment will find that China isn’t even close to being hemmed in strategically by a single relationship. In fact, and as a quick aside, the entire “Axis of Autocracies” is incongruent not only with China’s actual ambitions but also in terms of how Beijing has pursued foreign policy. The taxonomy applied is, well, just another reflection of an America hardwired to a 20th Century mindset. For the sake of argument though, if it is true that the underlying aim of the Trump administration is to leverage actions in one theater to destabilize China in the East Asia theater all that will be achieved is the equivalent of pushing on a string. The glaring omission of this theory is any consideration of China’s current expansive set of relationships across the Gulf region both in terms of scope and scale. Here are but a few examples. To start, there’s Qatar which is reported to be the second largest supplier of LNG (3million tons/year) to China. There’s Kuwait which was the first country in the region to sign on, formally, to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2014. Even Iraq. Here the two countries have a deep commercial relationship, including a 20-year “oil-for-construction” agreement. China imports as much oil from Iraq as it does from Russia. Finally, there’s Saudi Arabia, by far the single most significant relationship China has built in the region and a partnership that is far broader and deeper than that of any other Gulf nation. Here is the critical point to be made; what is highlighted above is a foreign policy that has been executed upon globally from Eastern Europe to South East Asia and all points between. Be it the Port of Piraeus in Greece or the linkage to the Belgrade-Budapest rail line. The massive energy investments in Indonesia or, not to be forgotten, the 950km newly operational rail line in Algeria. China has built redundancies across the globe and isn’t anywhere near at risk if it were to lose a single bilateral relationship. Ah, but what of China’s ability to protect those interests? The Beltway commentariat is also stressing that Beijing doesn’t have the necessary hard power (military assets) to fortify any of those relationships. This is most certainly true, but only to a point. The real question to be asked is how far can America extend its reach in seeking to counter/contain China? For me, the answer is found in history and with the British Empire. For all the galivanting around the globe during the latter half of the 19th Century, all the Gunboat diplomacy, it ultimately became impossible for the Empire to be in all places at all times. The same would hold for America today albeit with a key difference. China isn’t just a geopolitical rival; it is a deep pocketed rival and one which has built bilateral relationships that are commercial centric. It is also a position built over the course of three decades. There’s a degree of entrenchment that has yet to be properly appreciated in Washington. God speed! https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/china-playing-long-game-over-iran
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 4 days ago
China’s market closed higher on the day. image
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 4 days ago
Feel the need to share the following. "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." This is a quote from Napoleon Bonaparte and NOT Sun Tzu.
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 4 days ago
Well, it is just another Monday morning here in Shanghai.
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 5 days ago
Strongly advise reading this book. The only edition you should read. This specific book. Fantastic examples provided throughout. And I can say it has allowed me to properly assess much of the thinking out of Beijing when it comes to world affairs. Moreover, it has provided insight into how it is Beijing has operated over the past 30 years. image
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 1 week ago
China Morning Missive The Taiwan Issue Back behind the desk after a much needed Chinese New Year break. My goal for this Year of the Horse is to get to those of you interested more updates and insights into what is actually transpiring here on the ground in Shanghai. And you can help with this endeavor. If there are topics where you’d like my perspective, just let me know. For today, the topic is Taiwan and is being raised due to a recent NYT article which highlighted the “impending” military move by Beijing on Taiwan in 2027. The construct of the story centered on messages conveyed to American tech firms that rely heavily, if not exclusively, on chips made in Taiwan. A summary of that article is linked below. Allow me to stress that the probability of China moving on Taiwan next year is zero. Zero. That is both a strong opinion and one that is strongly held. The reason for such confidence comes from an actual understanding of Chinese history and experience with how it is that decisions such as these are made in Beijing. There is a basic premise which needs to be taken into account. If the peace cannot be won, then instigating war is to be avoided. It is all very Sun Tzu. Allow me to provide some historical context, specifically the two examples of when China, itself, was invaded and defeated. There were the Mongols in the early 1200s and then the Manchus in the mid 1600s. Why these data points matter when assessing the Taiwan issue is that, and in both instances, the end result had the ethnic Han Chinese fully assimilating the invaders over time. The Mongols ruled as the Yuan Dynasty for one thousand years and the Manchus ruled as the Qing Dynasty for 200+ years. For China, to conquer means to assimilate. Allow me to provide a more recent example, Hong Kong in 2019. Begin with an understanding that at the formal handover in 1997, Hong Kong was basically as an extremely British enclave. Once Beijing reassumed control, however, the borders were opened and over the next 20 years Mainland Chinese entered the city to live and work and became the dominate ethnic group. Hong Kong became just another Chinese city. It was fully assimilated and with it made the move by Beijing to assume full control relatively easy. None of these dynamics are at play when it comes to Taiwan. Most importantly, these dynamics are known by the Beijing leadership. If a move were made, and even if that move were successful, there would be no way that stability after-the-fact could be achieved. The objective is to maintain the status quo, and I am expecting an agreement along these lines to be reached in the next year or two. A formula that is supposedly being discussed would have the current status quo hold for the next 50 years. That means Taiwan would not unilaterally declare its independence and Beijing would commit to no military intervention. The two sides would codify this relationship in some sort of formal declaration, and the two sides would go back to doing what they do best. Commercially engage and make money. So what is with all the fear mongering out of Washington? Well, I’ll get to that tomorrow.
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 1 week ago
Back to providing an installment of my recent “Deconstructing Rivalry” Essay. Many of you will find today’s update of particular, even very specific, interest. It centers on diplomatic subterfuge via the IMF along with America’s original decision to debase its currency. In short, there is an important event that is too often overlooked when it comes to China’s motivations to build a parallel set of global systems, the nearly two-decade long process to reform IMF voting rights. It was, however, the policy response by Washington to the Global Financial Crisis, putting at risk China’s significant exposure to US Treasuries and GSEs, that demonstrated the length at which America would go to safeguard its unipolar primacy. Power, whenever required, would be wielded (weaponized) using the dominance of the US$ system. It would be the combination of these actions that would, ultimately, lead to the formal establishment of the BRICS block. View article → View article →
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 1 week ago
Ok. It is now official. I’ve lived in China for 30 years. Where did all that time go? Been a wild ride for sure and wouldn’t change a single thing about this journey. image
Peter Alexander's avatar
prc30 2 weeks ago
And if there wasn’t enough going on in the entire AI space, we just had Qwen 3.5 officially dropped. China - be it good or bad - is the accelerant here. If US markets are on shaky ground over the effects from a small number of siloed closed source players in Silicon Valley, just wait until PicoClaw, Seedance and, now, Qwen permeates the business media. image