Marcin Lis (Fox)'s avatar
Marcin Lis (Fox)
martin_fox@iris.to
npub1mmqm...5ehe
Marcin Lis (Fox)'s avatar
Marcin Lis (Fox) 1 month ago
W nowym odcinku What The Fox Says biorę na warsztat połączenie sztucznej inteligencji i zdrowia – narzędzia takie jak ChatGPT Health, Claude for Healthcare czy MedGemma od Google już teraz zaczynają wchodzić w proces diagnostyki i opieki medycznej. Pokazuję, gdzie AI realnie pomaga pacjentom i lekarzom (od lepszej diagnostyki obrazowej po odciążenie z biurokracji), ale też gdzie kończy się wsparcie, a zaczynają bardzo poważne ryzyka – od halucynacji modeli po nadużycia związane z danymi medycznymi. Rozmawiam też o tym, co oznacza to dla nas jako pacjentów: jak mądrze korzystać z medycznego AI, gdzie postawić granicę zaufania i dlaczego lekarz jeszcze długo pozostanie niezbędną częścią systemu.
What the Fox Says
AI, zdrowie i zielona energia
W tym odcinku wracam trochę wcześniej niż zwykle, bo wydarzyło się naprawdę sporo – od brytyjskiej ustawy o cyberbezpieczeństwie i rekord...
 #AI #zdrowie #medycyna #ChatGPT #Claude #Google #MedGemma #sztucznainteligencja #cyberbezpieczeństwo #podcast #WhatTheFoxSays
Marcin Lis (Fox)'s avatar
Marcin Lis (Fox) 1 month ago
I've been using Perplexity (premium), ChatGPT (free tier), and Grok (free tier) for some time now. Grok is great for searching the media—news, gossip, politics, etc. It works really well. But I'm definitely not going to pay Elon! ChatGPT is awesome somehow. I like “talking” to it the most, technical stuff is cool too, but I'm not going to pay for it. I mean, maybe, but differently (more on that in a moment). Perplexity - it was great at first, especially the research and lab modes. But the longer I use it, the more I see that in the regular “fast” mode, the answers are “crap,” and I end up using the research mode as my default. And in ChatGPT, I use the basic mode (remember, free tier), and it works fine. So I'm wondering. My free year of Perplexity from T-Mobile is about to end, and I don't know what to do. I started testing open-webui. I connected it to the OpenAI API and damn - I pay pennies (admittedly, only for testing so far), the answers are as accurate as in ChatGPT (because they are the same models), and (after all) there is more privacy than when using ChatGPT directly. And I don't have to worry about the ads that are coming soon to ChatGPT ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ Anyone have a better solution? #ai #ChatGPT #OpenAI #grok #perplexity #asknostr
Marcin Lis (Fox)'s avatar
Marcin Lis (Fox) 1 month ago
Privacy at risk Current situation in the world The modern digital landscape is characterised by an increasing confrontation between citizens' right to privacy and governments' aspirations for greater oversight of electronic communications. Authorities around the world are stepping up efforts to weaken or circumvent end-to-end encryption, often under the pretext of fighting crime, protecting children, or ensuring national security. These actions represent an unprecedented attack on the fundamental digital security infrastructure that protects billions of users from cybercriminals, authoritarian regimes, and other malicious actors. European Union One of the most controversial initiatives is the so-called Chat Control – a 2022 proposal from the European Commission that would require communication service providers to scan all private messages and files to detect child sexual abuse material (CSAM). This proposal has been further modified by successive presidencies of the Council of the EU, but its essence remains unchanged - the introduction of mandatory client-side scanning, which in practice means breaking end-to-end encryption. In October 2025, the Danish presidency again tried to push through this proposal, but met with strong opposition from member states. Germany, which had previously supported the proposal, changed its position and refused to support the Danish proposals on 7 October 2025, which meant that it did not have the required majority. Jens Spahn, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, stated: "We are against the surveillance of chats. It would be like preemptively opening all the letters to see if there is anything illegal in them. This is not acceptable." The Signal Foundation has officially stated that it will withdraw its application from the EU if Chat Control is adopted. Similar declarations have been made by other companies offering encrypted communication services. More than 40 European companies have published an open letter warning that Chat Control will destroy privacy, weaken encryption and seriously harm the competitiveness of European businesses. Characteristically, in the latest version of the proposal, state communications are excluded from the obligation to scan - while citizens and businesses would be subject to mass surveillance, politicians retain the right to private communications. United Kingdom The UK is using the Online Safety Act 2023 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to force tech companies to implement backdoors in encrypted services. Particularly dangerous are Technical Capability Notices (TCNs) - secret orders that can force companies to create opportunities for law enforcement to access encrypted data. And these are not just theoretically possible - in February 2025, it came to light that the British government issued a TCN against Apple, requiring the creation of a backdoor to the Advanced Data Protection service in iCloud. Initially, the order applied to all Apple users in the world, but after the US protests, it was modified to apply only to British users. Apple has decided to disable Advanced Data Protection in the UK altogether instead of creating a backdoor. However, it's important to remember that due to the connected nature of the internet, encryption issues are truly global. This order, if enforced, would set a dangerous precedent and force Apple to create vulnerabilities affecting users far beyond the UK. United States The EARN IT Act, introduced to the U.S. Congress in 2020, poses a direct threat to end-to-end encryption through a Section 230 modification that protects online platforms from liability for user-generated content. The bill would force service providers to monitor user content under the threat of losing legal protection. According to the Internet Society, the EARN IT Act would leave service providers with three options: weaken security by creating a backdoor to encrypted content, bypass end-to-end encryption by accessing content before or after the encryption process (client-side scanning), or stop offering end-to-end encrypted services altogether. The bill would threaten to destroy the foundations of online security, as there are numerous options for strong encryption outside the jurisdiction and control of the U.S. government and its allies. The result would be significant harm to the majority of the U.S. population, with no hope of achieving the stated goal. Australia Australia passed the Assistance and Access Act in 2018, which introduces three types of orders. Technical Assistance Requests (TARs), Technical Assistance Notices (TANs), and the most dangerous Technical Capability Notices (TCNs) require companies to build new capabilities to help law enforcement agencies access encrypted data. Mike Burgess, director of Australia's Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), threatened in September 2024 that he could soon use the powers to force tech companies to cooperate with warrants and unblock encrypted chats. This is the first concrete threat of using the most invasive powers provided for in the law. France France tried to introduce legislation in 2025 requiring encrypted messaging service providers such as Signal and WhatsApp to share decrypted data with law enforcement within 72 hours. The proposal was part of the law "Sortir la France du piège du narcotrafic" (Liberation of France from the trap of drug trafficking). On March 20, 2025, the French National Assembly rejected this proposal, which was considered a significant victory for digital rights, privacy, and security. MEPs understood that encryption protects everyone – not just activists and dissidents, but also journalists, medical professionals, victims of violence and ordinary citizens trying to live privately in an increasingly surveilled world. In response to these threats, France has introduced the "Résilience" law, Article 16 of which stipulates that providers of encryption services may not be obliged to incorporate technical devices designed to deliberately weaken the security of information systems and electronic communications. This is an unprecedented safeguard against future attempts to crack encryption. Canada In Canada, there is Bill C-26. Bill C-26 consists of two main parts. Part 1, which is modifications to the Telecommunications Act giving the government the power to promote the security of Canada's telecommunications system, and Part 2, called the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act, which establishes a regulatory framework for strengthening cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. While the bill officially aims to protect critical infrastructure, critics warn that it could be used for surveillance and control of communications. The bill requires organizations to report cybersecurity incidents within 72 hours, which may include access to encrypted communications. India In India, Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 introduce a traceability requirement for "significant social media intermediaries." This requirement authorizes national security agencies to track the "initiator" of encrypted communications under a court order issued under Section 69 of the IT Act. WhatsApp argues that enforcing traceability requirements would essentially mean dismantling E2E encryption, as it would require providers to retain data that allows access to the content of encrypted messages. WhatsApp, represented by parent company Meta, challenged IT Rules in the Delhi High Court, warning: "If they tell us to break the encryption, then WhatsApp is leaving." Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act 2023 also allows for the interception of messages in the event of a public emergency, public safety, interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, national security, or public order. The broad and vague definitions of telecommunications services in the bill have led to speculation that it could give the state the ability to order online messaging apps (instant messaging) to decrypt encrypted messages. China China has developed the world's most sophisticated VPN blocking system, using three levels of detection. IP blocking of known consumer VPN servers, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) or "fingerprint" analysis of VPN protocols, and active scanning and searching for new VPN servers. Does this mean you can't use a VPN in China? Not really. Only government-approved VPNs are legal in China. These are typically for corporate use and must be sourced from state-owned telecommunications companies. Personal use is not technically illegal in every case, but it is severely limited and actively discouraged through advanced detection methods. In 2021, China blocked Signal, an end-to-end encrypted messaging app. Signal has joined the ranks of foreign technologies blocked in China, now only available through a VPN. This is part of a broader campaign led by Xi Jinping for "Internet Sovereignty". Russia Russia and Telegram – In 2018, the Russian government began blocking access to Telegram, requiring the app to store encryption keys for all user correspondence and share them with the Federal Security Service (FSB) upon request. Telegram refused, arguing that the FSB's requirements were not technically feasible and violated the constitutional rights of Russian citizens to the privacy of correspondence. In the landmark judgment of Podchasov v. Russia of February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that weakening encryption can lead to general and mass surveillance of all users' communications and violates the human right to privacy. The Court found that forcing decryption of communications could weaken encryption protection for all users. This did not change the approach of the Russian authorities, and in August 2025 Roskomnadzor (the telecommunications market supervisory authority in Russia) banned the use of the Signal app, arguing the need to maintain national security. In addition, starting September 1, 2025, Moscow has introduced additional restrictions on the use of VPN technology, including a ban on advertising VPNs or sharing information about circumventing the bans. Brazil In Brazil, the debate about encryption ended up in the Supreme Court. Brazil's Supreme Court is considering the first cases on whether end-to-end encryption is allowed under Brazilian law and whether it would not be mandatory for law enforcement to have access capabilities. The cases concern the suspension of WhatsApp for failing to comply with court orders requiring the company to hand over decrypted data. Judge Fachin argued that imposing solutions that include exceptional access or reduce the protection provided by strong encryption protocols are incompatible with the Brazilian legal order. Judge Rosa Weber added that there is a "fundamental right to encryption" in order to "protect the right to privacy." In June 2025, a majority of Brazil's Supreme Court voted to overturn the safe harbor clause on internet governance, influencing digital platforms and social media companies. This means a new set of rules requiring digital platforms to actively remove third-party content on their own or at the user's request without the need for a court decision. Global impact and consequences These and other government actions not mentioned by me, introduced by both totalitarian and democratic states, lead to fragmentation of the global Internet, where different regions have different standards of privacy and security. Users in countries with restrictive regulations are forced to choose between security and access to services. As cybersecurity experts point out, there is no way to ensure government access to end-to-end encrypted data without introducing vulnerabilities that compromise the security and privacy of every user. Backdoors created for the "good guys" will inevitably be used by cybercriminals and hostile states. This will have the most damaging effect on those who are already most at risk. Families, victims of domestic violence, LGBTQ+ people, and many others who rely on the security and privacy provided by end-to-end encrypted services. Journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders in particular rely on strong encryption to protect their identities and confidential communications. The current actions of authorities around the world represent an unprecedented attack on the fundamental infrastructure of digital security. Under the pretext of protecting children, fighting terrorism or national security, governments are trying to systematically weaken encryption, which is the basis of security in the digital world. The consensus among global cybersecurity experts is unequivocal. There is no way to provide government access to end-to-end encrypted data without introducing vulnerabilities that compromise the security of all users. History shows time and time again that every weakness is an easy target for criminals, malicious hackers, and hostile actors. Citizens, civil society organizations, and tech companies must continue to fight to protect encryption as a fundamental right to privacy and security in the digital age. Without strong encryption, our democratic societies become more vulnerable to authoritarianism, cybercrime, and human rights violations. This article was initially published on
marcin-lis.pl
Privacy at risk
 #privacy #goverment #authorities #eu #uk #usa #safety #encryption #e2e
Marcin Lis (Fox)'s avatar
Marcin Lis (Fox) 2 months ago
No i mamy kolejny odcinek !!
What the Fox Says
Baterie przyszłości, satelity Amazona i kryzys open source: od GitLaba po upadek ingress-nginx
(0:00) Baterie all solid state w EV Chińczycy uruchamiają pierwszą globalną linię produkcyjną baterii all solid state, zastępujących ciekł...
 #podcast #foss #opensource #technology #internet #nginx Chińczycy odpalają pierwszą linię produkcyjną baterii all solid state z realną szansą na elektryki o zasięgu ponad 1000 km, Amazon wchodzi na poważnie w internet satelitarny z terminalem Leo Ultra i pomysłami na data center w kosmosie, a w publicznych repozytoriach GitLaba wciąż leżą tysiące „żywych” sekretów – od kluczy GCP po tokeny OpenAI. Do tego kontrowersyjna unijna „chat‑kontrola”, przejęcie Arduino przez Qualcomma z mocnym odjazdem od idei open source oraz decyzja o wygaszeniu ingress‑nginx pokazują, jak krucha jest infrastruktura, na której stoi dzisiejszy internet. Jeśli chcesz zrozumieć, dokąd zmierzają prywatność, satelity, chmura i open source, ten odcinek jest dla Ciebie
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