ok, time to return offline, se you soon my digital friends🙏🤗

life is a paradox, you need to be a paradoxer to surf it

socials are bad, but the idea behind social network was good: extend the possibility to connect to people using internet, breaking the physical local barriers, on your own terms. This is why nostr. Today with social platforms you are forced to choose to rent this possibility to bad people who will try to hack you with all their forces to make you miserable and slave; or give up on (most of) the possibility of internet-enanched sociality; keeping your social graph entirely offline, in the old way, limiting the possibility to discovery new perspective from all around the word. Sincerely, in this situation I prefer the second alternative: traditional social platforms are so bad in connecting people that I feel better and "more connected" simply disconnecting from them. But there is a piece of the cake I'm missing, every human today is forced to choose and everyone is missing something, everyone differently with his peculiar situation. Nostr is still the best shot we have to fix that.

This is huge! View quoted note →

today super grateful for a fantastic sun over my skin and a beautiful insight on chroot and containers in general🥰

#YESTR there's literally nothing beyond you and God, that is in you and all the other stuffs. Everything is fine if you align yourself to God, inside and outside. Everything is broken if you dont humbly embrace this power. View quoted note →

user namespace is really a cool concept in #linux, basically an elegant way to permit to user processes to mount an entire filesystem where they can act as root. It is used in containers and browser sandboxes, to effectively isolate processes. But there are problems here: now, when user namespaces is activated in the kernel, ANY user process (so any random app) can access a gigantic amout of functions and kernel calls that was intended to be ran from a root user. These functions have bugs. These bugs wasnt a security threat before, because if you are already root and you are invoking a kernel function to trigger a bug that makes the kernel crash.... Well, you was already root. The process that invoked the function was already in total control of the machine, so the bug was basically useless for hackers to use in a chain of exploits. Now, with user namespaces, a user process can invoke these functions to trigger the bugs to crash the kernel or whatelse: these bugs now are security threats. Solutions? Seems there isnt a better alternative to do this kind of sandboxing in linux, so the solutions are [fixing the bugs®] and restrict the capability of use user namespaces to a whitelist of trusted apps (like containers, browsers, flatpak, systemd-something, and apps that in the future will start using it....)

S U P E R C Y C L E View quoted note →