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Final
final@stacker.news
npub1hxx7...g75y
Security specialist and member of the GrapheneOS Foundation. Posts my own and not endorsed by my employer. AI slop and Nostr DMs ignored. Email: final@grapheneos.org Matrix: f1nal:grapheneos.org
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Final 2 months ago
Lightning support in Cake Wallet should be huge for XMR nostr users image
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Final 2 months ago
New update of #GrapheneOS with this month's full security patch level. With the security preview release, all of the Android 16 security patches from the current March 2026, April 2026, May 2026, June 2026, July 2026 and August 2026 Android Security Bulletins are here too. View quoted note →
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Final 2 months ago
With Motorola, there will be at least one officially supported flagship device to run GrapheneOS around 2027, but once we have one we should be able to add the other flagship variants too and we will work to broaden our device support where possible. If you want examples of Motorola devices that have been close to meeting GrapheneOS requirements so far, then the latest Motorola Signature, Motorola razr fold and razr ultra are some. You can expect possible successors to these devices to have support. Through this partnership we also hope to see some security improvements provided in #GrapheneOS implemented into the Motorola stock operating system. We want OEMs to improve their security practices across the board. GrapheneOS for Motorola devices, like on Pixels, will be developed by us, with updates distributed by us. You will not be missing any features either. View quoted note →
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Final 2 months ago
This March we hope to officially announce our OEM partner whose future devices shall work to support GrapheneOS.
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Final 3 months ago
Proud to say my 'Never Went to Black Hat' award is looking very shiny right now.
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Final 3 months ago
This is a tablet PC with Cellebrite UFED, a mobile forensics acquisition software. Users plug a target device into it where it then will attempt to extract as much data on the device as possible. The software on the laptop is Physical Analyser which is for forensic analysis. This video is dated, and Cellebrite UFED's UI, logo and capabilities have changed a lot since the video was released. This tool is also not exclusive to UK law enforcement and there are also competitor solutions, which many countries around the world use plus the competitors. Cellebrite sell a variant of this product named Cellebrite Premium. The difference to standard UFED and Premium is that Premium comes with wider device extraction support through zero-day exploits. As described it also allows extraction of vulnerable devices that are locked. This business model is not exclusive. XRY Pro (MSAB) and GrayKey (Magnet Forensics) are other exclusive forensic tools. Cellebrite are the second-oldest of the three companies (on joining the forensics market) but are one of the most capable thanks to their funding and location. How and if these tools are able to extract your device's data depends on: - The device you are using - The installed OS and version - The lock state of the device - Configured security settings of the device - Strength of your phone's unlock credential For a locked device exploiting security vulnerabilities is required to extract data almost all of the time. There are two different device lock states on Android and iOS: After first unlock (AFU, Hot) and before first unlock (BFU, Cold). This is due to how encryption works. Modern Android and iOS encrypt all users' data by default with keys derived from the user's credentials. When a device is unlocked once, data is no longer encrypted at rest and is accessible during that boot session. When a device is BFU, all sensitive data is at rest. Data not being at rest provides more OS attack surface to exploit bypassing lock screens or other measures and access to the data without needing the original PIN/password to decrypt it. For BFU devices brute forcing is required to decrypt data first and the only data not encrypted is a minimal footprint of the OS used for unlocking the device and global OS configuration and metadata. To make extraction impossible make sure your device is powered off and you use a secure, high-entropy passphrase before seizure. GrapheneOS provides a configurable, automatic inactivity reboot feature. We also provide several other countermeasures to these tools as well. GrapheneOS locked devices as a whole is unsupported by Cellebrite. If you are an opposition activist in a high-risk country you should be concerned about potential attacks from such tools. They have been abused to target activists in numerous countries like Serbia and Jordan. Despite if a business claims this use of their product like this is unauthorised, it doesn't change the fact that they will be used like this again, that they don't know about it until after it has violated someone's rights and that the security vulnerabilities remain unpatched. GrapheneOS provides an auto-reboot to put data at rest, a USB-C port control to disable data transfer or the port entirely when booted into the OS, clearing sensitive data of memory and exploit protection features. View quoted note →