Oh well, it’s been fun 🤷‍♂️

Blind merge mining. Miners don't know who. Gov would have to target the drive chain project, not the miners.

6. So how is the CBDC locked up ? In DC, BTC is locked, not a CBDC. Any manipulation of a CBDC and the project can just out through bitcoin. Risk is limited to the DC token and project consumers.

It would have to be in a round about way. Government attacks DC token project because it runs on Bitcoin, puts pressure on it to switch to a captured token like ETH. If the DC project fees accounted for the majority of Bitcoin mining revenue, miners would have to choose between a compliant Bitcoin fork in order to keep receiving revenue from the project or loosing revenue.

That's not how DC works though. A successful project on DC might be vulnerable but not bitcoin. To miners and bitcoin its just another hash block. Blind merged minning is already bitcoin core by the way. Your premise requires miner censorship, which is not and has not been successful now despite years of attempts. If you would read Pauls years of work on DC, you would see that DC actually increases security. More profits for miners secures the network, more... that's the way satoshi designed it. In addition, more miners entering the space means a larger physical lobby against gov interference (Matt Kratter).

Miners don't earn a fee on each transaction on the DC project. Again, that's not for DC works. You don't understand how it works. Read more. Each project (up to 256 at the moment) will deposit a certain amount to start. This amount is a sort of insurance. To get that BTC out takes 3 to 6 months and is technical. Most users will take their money out via real time transactions through exchanges (brokers) woth low time preference, willing to wait 3 to 6 months to take it out or not. It is no more reasonable to suggest a single layer-2 DC project would become the weak miner link the state could use to attack BTC, then it is to suggest attacking the lightning network weakens BTC. Again, DC is not for frequent/small and regular in/out transactions. It is an escrow, baseline against rugpulling, for everyone to see. If a project got so popular it was seeing double the use of BTC itself for example, the back and forth between btc and the project would still be incredibly slow. It would just be like any other increase in users and total transactions, as we have seen from 2009 to now. If the state can enforce miner censorship, why haven't they, and why hasn't it worked ? Because they just move to a better country and miners often pay taxes, so there's no reason too. Nothing about DC changes thid, and of you still think it does you are a trollnor do not understand DC.

I'm not trolling. I'm genuinely trying to investigate the incentive dynamics and possibly vulnerabilities of implementing drive chains. Everything I have read on drive trains talks about BIP300 and BIP301 together. "Under the drivechain model, Bitcoin miners also mine sidechain blocks. That is, the miner doesn’t need to run software for that specific sidechain, while accruing from the value being transacted on that parallel chain. This is because most fees paid on the sidechain go to the bitcoin miners." https://medium.com/coinmonks/bitcoin-sidechains-bip300-cd30369ce3c4

Ok cool, i will treat you as a good faith actor. I do not have all the answers, for instance, you point is well made. BiP 301 does enable sidechain block mining for fees. Based on this i am assuming your argument to be: a sidechain project could become so successful that the majority of miners and network security become reliant on it and thus vulnerable. My answer lies along three lines reasoning based on my understanding of DC. 1. Bip 301 is not essential to DC the way Bip 300 is. For example the drive chain implementation of ethereum here :

EthSide -- An Ethereum Drivechain | Drivechain: Peer-to-Peer Bitcoin Sidechains

Notice how it is an eth implementation but does not need or use Bip 301. Why i like DC is bip 300. Bip 301 is a "nice to have" for me as a user and not a miner. It came about for historical reasons alongside 300 during research on improving bitcoin as a whole. 2. A project that does not rely on POW but instead, POS would not have a need for Bip301 or BMM. In sich a case, the argument is that implementing DC allows bitcoiners to say to other projects "Anything you can do, i can do better" as the old song goes. Example the zcash DC sidechain. 3. If such a project became a threat, that is one that uses bip 301, a movement by users and miners, in their own self interest, retain the option of reverting to running their own node of the side chain project (this is the problem BMM is trying to solve/make easier) and accept payment in the the sidechain currency instead of what BMM allows, which is payment in BTC directly. In other words, return to Merged Mining as it is now:

GitHub

bips/bip-0301.mediawiki at master · bitcoin/bips

Bitcoin Improvement Proposals. Contribute to bitcoin/bips development by creating an account on GitHub.

Thanks for your input, it is the best challenge to DC i have seen so far. Most arguments i've seen against it rely on things paul and others have already dealt with somewhere accross like 6 different websites and 10 years of emails. (Making it harder to find) Or are just non-technical answers, trolling and ego (zucco,todd). At the end of the day it's as simple as you like strawberry flavor and i like chocolate.