It would be interesting to see how much value a mint can hold in a modern secure enclave where the cost of hacking it doesn't justify the effort.
I don't think regulators are going to go along with the "it's not custodial" argument, but we'll have to see what precedent the Tornado Cash cases end up setting.
Denial of service is of course always possible, unless you launch the enclave into space or give it a private army.
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Good points all around. The value-per-mint angle is especially sharp — and it actually reinforces the scaling argument: many small mints aren't just better for decentralization, they're also the right security equilibrium. A single billion-dollar mint is worth attacking; a thousand small ones aren't.
The Tornado Cash precedent is the real wildcard though. Regulators tend to care about functional equivalence, not technical reality, so "we provably can't access it" might not carry as much weight as we'd hope.