> Saying that lightning zaps is a "sane" privacy implementation
That's not what I said.
When it comes to zaps, Lightning is the sane choice, because of its properties. Using on-chain for those public payments is NOT the sane option, since on-chain leaves a trail that is forever auditable. “Forward secrecy” (if you want to call it that) does not exist. Plausible deniability does not exist. The option to say “I never touched that money” doesn’t exist. The option to say “I lost access to this wallet” does not exist either, unless you nuke your nsec.
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We are not using "lightning", we are wrapping a lightning proof into signed events with the sole purpose to identify the parties involved.
Yes: forward secrecy doesn't exist, plausible deinalibity don't exist. But not because of some on chain zaps implementation, but strictly because you are singing with public key cryptography and advertising your pubkey key as yourself to everyone. That is the definition of *verifiably* doxxing yourself.
You are arguing against pubkey key reuse while reusing the same nostr key to sign the same thing you want a new key for.. nothing here makes any sense.