Replies (31)
When the boys are out here sharpening iron with iron to make the ultimate security HWW π₯ΊπΏ
How is Block running the key server, mobile app, and BitKey as a 2 of 3 isn't distributing risk?
Let alone the UTXO privacy concerns.
Everything has trade offs, you forgot a few.
I feel a bit sad reading posts like this. How the fuck will we ever get all this safe and usable for mainstream.
Here we fucking go again.
π₯Choose your fighter!βοΈ
It's already safe and usable by mainstream. Some folks tend to make bigger issues of nothing new.
There is no fight, people will always disagree.
Nothing is without trade offs.
Needed to dial up the sarcasm emojis on that one.
Agreed. I think this is very healthy dialogue and I love that itβs being discussed.
COLDCARD is excellent; thank you for your dedication to security.
Question: when someone buys a hardware wallet they provide a shipping address that can later be leaked. Ledger famously leaked customer emails and physical addresses for example. Any tips on mitigating that? Use an alias and ship to your employerβs address?
The only question mark is the key server.
App is open source and reproduceable.
Coinkite deletes the shipping information after 90 days, but that's a promise you can't verify.
Best yet, is to use a alias, pay with bitcoin and ship to a pobox or hotel instead. Or buy in person from a reseller.
Thanks for commenting on this
So what's your preferred standard for anti-exfil?
Anti-exfil makes even closed source hardware wallets somewhat trustworthy as the companion app has the user's back.
Nonce attacks are just one of a million types of attacks.
I want anti-klepto spec that is implemented on core and is transported via PSBT.
We don't want more vendor specific stuff
At the end of the day you gotta choose something, cold card and bitbox are my choice.
However in the Bitkey model effectively you have two hot keys (phone and key server) which is a big trade off even if itβs source viewable (it is not FOSS), and your hardware wallet has no screen so you could easily approve a transfer to an address other than you intended if someone has hijacked your phone and what appears on its screen. The Bitkey is a $150 glorified yubikey.
This is true, which is why it makes sense at the $25 promo price.
At the $150 asking price, it's a tapsigner with an added fingerprint sensor, but with additional tradeoffs and vendor lock-in.
I can only see this being a useful product if they keep the current model for entry-level users and unlock it for use as a blind signer for any multisig setup.
> if someone has hijacked your phone and what appears on its screen.
this is common for all blind signers, not a bitkey specific issue.
"Blah blah, they all suck except for the ones I like" It never ends with hardware vs software wallets. Have both, split your money up idk. I just wish everyone assumed that everything sucked and can't be completely trusted.
To me this type of content is twatter leakage.
Any blind signer can be turned into a non-blind one with 2 things:
1. Extra code in the signer to check if the sign request is signed by the screen device
2. A screen device that shows the transaction, and produces a signature for it if approved (this can be less secure)
π―
Yeah I agree if it was $25 it makes a lot more sense.
However I think other blind signers are marketed differently and sold to a largely different audience. My guess is people buying say a tapsigner and using Nunchuk are more educated on these trade offs.
If it protects the user against a backdoor hidden deep in some fringe dependency, maybe "we" want anti-klepto.
Isn't it marvelous that the deterministic nature of Bitcoin can let a companion app verify a hardware wallet is following the protocol in a non-leaking way? I find this unbelievable and would want that for my hardware wallet to sleep sound at night, knowing that nobody can exfiltrate keys. No supplier. No library provider. No engineer around me. Not even with a gun to their head they could succeed.
Who will write the standard if not you or your peers?
The hyperbolic recommendations being made in some of the original posts⦠what is stopping ColdCard from adding this probable random capability?
Hardware limitation, or just developer hours?
Those posts Aside***
Lack of standards and transport, we will not expose people to USB risk for this. This to use PSBTs.
Core tends to lead the way on these things, there is no Core support for it.
It's minimal additional data that fits comfortably into your BBQRs. Why bring up USB here?
The current spec used for this protocol is over usb and custom hwi.
Ideally there would be an extra field on PSBT. And the clients would include in it. We would taken take it and sign it. And to feel comfortable I want to see core with a proposed implementation of the client side.
Messing with nonces is dangerous as fuck.
Makes sense, USB is a cluster fuck.
I donβt get it thenβ¦ how is BitBox claiming to do this securely?
They claim airgap is bad or something π
"Core" is not an entity you should ever be waiting for. If you were serious about this, you would sponsor somebody writing a BIP. Can't be that hard to spec this out.