A lot of Bitchcoin marximalists sharing this bullshit: View quoted note → Ok, here we go.👇 Receiver Privacy Claim 1: Sharing your address with the sender leaks your identity. Reality: Necessary step for any payment system. Sharing an address is not a trace, it’s a direct exchange. ✅ Not a protocol leak. 🛡️ Use subaddresses or one-time addresses to avoid any reuse. Claim 2: Sender learns one of your stealth public keys. Reality: That’s how Monero payments work, stealth addresses protect receiver privacy from everyone else. ✅ Only visible to sender and receiver. 🛡️ No third-party can observe or link stealth keys on chain. Claim 3: Sender can link the stealth key to your Monero address. Reality: Only possible if you reused an address. Otherwise, stealth outputs are unlinkable. ✅ Still not on chain traceable. 🛡️ Use a new subaddress for each sender = Unlinkability preserved. Claim 4: Recipient sees the amount they received. Reality: This is expected. The receiver has to know how much they got. ✅ No one else can see the amount due to RingCT. 🛡️ Zero privacy leakage occurs on chain. Sender Privacy Claim 5: Inputs can be linked using the “common input ownership” heuristic. Reality: This is a guess based on multiple inputs being used in one transaction. It’s not proof. ✅ No on chain trace. 🛡️ Modern wallets avoid this by using just one input where possible. Ring signatures still hide which input was really spent. Claim 6: Ring signatures can have decoys eliminated. Reality: This is only possible when the attacker controls some decoys, which is rare. ✅ Protocol still provides strong plausible deniability. 🛡️ Monero’s 16 member rings + decoy algorithms minimize risk. Amount Privacy Claim 7: Fees are visible and could fingerprint wallet type. Reality: Fees are public for blockchain function but do not expose who made the payment. ✅ No linkable identity or trace. 🛡️ No amounts, addresses, or parties are exposed just the fee. UX hurdles, not tracing risks. Claim 8: Some wallets share your view key with a server. Reality: True for light wallets that sync faster by scanning remotely. The server can see which outputs belong to you. ✅ No on-chain trace. 🛡️ Use wallets that scan locally (like Feather Wallet or Monero CLI Wallet) to keep full control over your privacy. 🛡️ Use Tor (like built-in in Cake Wallet), I2P, or your own node = Full privacy restored. Claim 9: Reusing your Monero address hurts privacy. Reality: True, if you give the same address to multiple people, they can tell it’s all going to you. ✅ Still not traceable on chain. 🛡️ Use subaddresses or a new address for every sender. Monero makes this easy. Claim 10: Rotating Monero keys is hard. Reality: True, if someone sends to an old address after you delete the keys, you can’t access the funds. ✅ But no data becomes traceable. 🛡️ Just back up your wallet properly. Privacy isn’t broken, it’s just a usability challenge. Not a single point here proves that Monero can be traced. Every so-called “leak” is either a necessary part of sending or receiving funds, or an off chain risk based on user behavior, or a solvable UX limitation, not a break in privacy. The protocol holds. The math holds. Your privacy holds. None of this proves Monero is traceable. What it does prove is this: Privacy depends on more than just the protocol, it depends on you. In every news story about Monero being “tracked,” the tracked user has made multiple critical OpSec mistakes. Authorities, seeing this as an opportunity, claim they can track Monero, but they are actually engaging in propaganda to dissuade, discourage and confuse people.