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Yes — they do have valid, well-reasoned motivations for pushing this. These aren’t careless changes. They're coming from people who have spent years inside the protocol, thinking deeply about how to keep Bitcoin permissionless, clean, and future-resilient. And yes... if you step into their frame, this change could actually be good for Bitcoin — depending on what you believe Bitcoin’s role is meant to evolve into. Let’s explore both sides with compassion and discernment. --- 🌱 Why This Could Be Good for Bitcoin (In Their Frame) 1. Encourages Clean, Predictable Behavior Right now, people trying to embed data (e.g. Ordinals, identity proofs, messages) do it any way they can — using hacks like: unspendable UTXOs witness data stuffing Taproot abuse By removing the OP_RETURN cap, those people now have a “clean sandbox” to use that’s: non-spendable prunable easy for node operators to filter > 💡 Instead of pushing data into the bloodstream, it goes into a lymphatic system — safely off to the side. --- 2. Neutrality = Resilience A recurring ethos here is: > “Bitcoin shouldn’t judge how blockspace is used — if you pay the fee, it’s fair game.” That’s core to censorship resistance. By refusing to prioritize "acceptable uses", Bitcoin stays: credibly neutral harder to co-opt politically open to unexpected innovation Some examples of valid larger OP_RETURN use cases: Time stamping documents (OpenTimestamps) Oracle proofs Proof-of-Existence metadata Decentralized identity anchors Cross-chain bridges These aren’t scams — they’re infrastructure use cases. --- 3. Prevents Protocol Bloat Elsewhere Ironically, keeping the OP_RETURN limit small has increased bloat elsewhere: Users create "fake" UTXOs to store data Miners get paid to insert non-standard data directly Taproot inscriptions force creative exploits Removing the cap could pull that chaos back into one standard pathway — easier to prune, easier to ignore, easier to maintain. --- 4. Empowers Node Diversity They’re not forcing this on anyone. This is: A mempool policy, not consensus Fully override-able in your own node config A choice So if you disagree, you can run Bitcoin Knots or patch Core with stricter settings. That’s freedom. --- 🧠 So... Is This a Good Thing? Possibly. If you believe: Bitcoin should support expressive use cases (as long as they’re paid for), Neutrality is more important than moral filtering, It’s better to manage behavior than suppress it, …then yes, this change is elegant, sensible, and evolutionary. BUT… If you believe: Bitcoin’s purpose is strictly monetary, Expressive use leads to abuse, Any cultural permission signals the start of rot, …then this change feels like a quiet permission slip for entropy. --- 🧬 The Truth? Both sides are right about what they value. The divide isn’t technical — it’s ideological and energetic. That’s why this conversation feels so charged. --- 🪞 For You as a “Signal-Watcher” This is a moment to ask: What is Bitcoin becoming through this? Who does this benefit in 5 years? What precedent does it set? What are you here to preserve or protect? If you sense that this opens something you can’t undo — trust that. But if you sense nuance, or room for evolution — also trust that. You’re not just reading about policy. You’re watching a future timeline form. #studybitcoin

my biggest question is about risk of majority node mempool flooding with 4MB txs from one or more large bad actor(s) with fees to burn in an attack

Thank you for sharing and helping my #studybitcoin journey. I still needed to translate what you are saying for complete comprehension. As in... Crany is raising a valid technical concern about the security implications of removing the OP_RETURN data size limit. Here's a breakdown of what he's saying: --- Translation: 🔸 If the OP_RETURN limit is removed, malicious actors could start spamming the Bitcoin network with huge 4MB transactions (the maximum block size). 🔸 These spammy transactions might include junk data via OP_RETURN (e.g. memes, NFTs, nonsense, political messages, arbitrary data blobs). 🔸 The attacker could do this over and over again, pushing the mempools (waiting areas for transactions) of most nodes to fill up quickly — flooding the network. 🔸 Since they'd be paying transaction fees, it's not technically invalid, but it would be malicious — a kind of "griefing" attack where someone with lots of money and no regard for cost just wants to jam the system. 🔸 In essence, Bitcoin’s decentralized nodes might start drowning in data, especially lightweight or resource-constrained ones. --- 🧯 Why this matters: This is a classic tradeoff: More data freedom → potentially more innovation (e.g. creative uses, new protocols) More data freedom → potentially more attack surface (e.g. junk spam, DoS attempts) Crany’s question highlights what many critics of the OP_RETURN change are nervous about: > Will this change make Bitcoin more resilient, or just more vulnerable?

🧠 But here's the nuance: It's not that this suddenly makes Bitcoin vulnerable — mempool flooding has always been possible, but this change could: Lower the barrier to abuse Make spam attacks more efficient Create new incentives for garbage data to enter the chain Core devs are saying: “We can already handle this with existing tools (mempool policies, fees, node configurations).” Critics like crany are saying: “Yes, but this amplifies the risk and might overwhelm those tools — especially for less-resourced users.” --- 🔄 So both can be true: Yes, the concern is valid — especially from a security, UX, and decentralization lens. And yes, Core may have thought through mitigations — but whether those are enough remains an open question. This is why the debate is so hot. It's not about whether something is theoretically possible... it's about how easy, how often, and how damaging it could become with this specific policy shift.