Thanks. I'll need a bit to digest, but it looks like this will be super helpful. The ability of clients to quickly and efficiently filter out events that don't have a valid OTS timestamp (where "valid" means that they don't have an OTS timestamp that falls within a specified recency window after their created_at) should be a fundamental part of the Nostr protocol. It's about as important as the ability to filter out events that don't have a valid signature in the first place. I'll likely have questions after I've had a chance to think about your explanation ...

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Constant's avatar
Constant 3 days ago
Yeah clients can run this type of verification really easy. To optimize things (i.e. not having to fetch a bunch of crap that might not be relevant, or does not have proofs etc.) my proposal is to leverage relays. Those relays can publish their policy on all the metrics you can imagine irt OTSproofs; so if you pick the right relays they have done a lot of the pre-filtering for you.