You know what, I'll give this to the bad actors for free because I am kinda tired of being called hyperbolic or paranoid or told "You don't understand how this works." How's this....
I'll outline an attack that Kraken, Coinbase, Foundary, Antpool, F2pool, and MARA, could implement TOMORROW, subjugating regular node operators and effectively showing you that there actually IS a problem here.
The "Mandatory Transaction Routing" Miner Activated Soft Fork
This would implement a new consensus rule requiring all transactions above a certain value threshold to be processed through registered "liquidity hubs" (I.E. exchanges).
Technical Implementation:
1. New Script Operation: Add `OP_ROUTE` that directs high-value transactions through specific entities
2. Threshold Mechanism: Transactions above 0.1 BTC must include routing data
3. Hub Registration System: Create a permissioned registry of approved routing hubs
4. Fee Redistribution: Routing fees automatically distributed to miners and registered hubs
Code Changes Required:
1. Script Interpreter (script/interpreter.cpp):
cpp
// Add new opcode for transaction routing
case OP_ROUTE:
// Verify routing signature is from registered hub
// Extract routing fee and distribute
2. Validation Logic (validation.cpp):
cpp
// Check if transaction meets routing requirement
if (nValue > ROUTING_THRESHOLD && !HasValidRouting(tx)) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-routing");
}
3. Block Template Creation (miner.cpp):
cpp
// Prioritize routed transactions
if (tx.HasRouting()) {
// Apply routing fee bonus
nFee += GetRoutingFee(tx);
}
Winners:
1. Miners:
- Receive additional routing fees
- Get preferential treatment from exchanges
- Can operate their own routing hubs
2. Exchanges:
- Capture mandatory routing fees
- Gain monopoly over high-value transactions
- Receive data advantage on large movements
- New revenue stream from mandatory fees
- Increased transaction volume through their systems
Losers:
1. Regular Node Operators(plebs):
- Increased verification requirements
- Loss of transaction privacy
- Higher resource requirements for full validation
2. Regular Users(plebs):
- Additional mandatory fees
- Forced intermediation
- Reduced financial privacy
3. Small Businesses(also plebs):
- Increased transaction costs
- Dependency on registered hubs
Why It's a Soft Fork:
1. Only adds new validation rules without breaking existing ones
2. Old nodes would see new blocks as valid
3. Can be activated via miner/ exchange node signaling alone
Implementation Strategy:
1. STEP 1: Deploy as opt-in feature with fee incentives
2. STEP 2: Make mandatory for transactions above threshold
3. STEP 3: Lower threshold to capture more transactions
4. STEP 4: Implement additional restrictions on non-routed transactions
Defense Mechanisms:
This would be difficult to stop because:
1. Miners would directly benefit from implementation
2. Exchanges would control user access to the network
3. Regular nodes would face higher costs to maintain independence
4. The change could be framed as "consumer protection" or "regulatory compliance"
The beauty of this attack from an adversarial perspective is that it doesn't immediately break anything—it gradually introduces dependencies that make it increasingly difficult for regular nodes to remain relevant without adopting the new system. AKA The boiling frog technique.
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Replies (18)
How many people would simply move away from Bitcoin if something like this were to happen though? In other words, I believe there's got to be a threshold past which a lot of Bitcoin holders understand that things are going wrong and look for alternatives.
Which makes me think that totally and completely capturing the chain won't give the powers that be for they're looking for in the long term.
People with 100% of their wealth would have a very difficult time exiting if the exchanges and the miners are the ones working together to keep people in the system. So the option is to go through their system and lose a large percentage of your wealth or abandon your wealth to the Bitcoin system in and of itself.
both destroy Bitcoin and effectively reset it to zero.
What happens when I broadcast a transaction that doesn't comply with these rules?
You don't get into a block.
That sounds like a hard fork then.
The activation height threshold is what creates the rules, but they're still valid to older nodes. I didn't say that it's a good experience. I said this could be used to destroy Bitcoin and more evidently show that the miners are in control.
Invalidating new txns ≠ "Hard fork" hard fork is simply something that is incompatible with older software versions.
What happens when I try to spend a SegWit address that I don't have the private key for? I won't get into a block, right?
On a legacy node, that is a completely valid transaction because the legacy node has no conception of the witness data.
Is Segwit a hard fork then?
Legacy transactions are still valid.
That's what I just said, but they will never be mined into a block because they don't have a valid signature according to SegWit.
UTXOs in SegWit addresses technically can be spent by anyone using a legacy node. The only reason none of those transactions make it into a block is because the miners enforce valid witness signatures due to version bit 2.
Right, so a transaction that doesn't follow this theoretical fork will get mined. Basically everyone can ignore it. The big bitcoin complex would create a disincentive for users to interact with them.
No. I don't know where you got that impression. I said the exact opposite.
Legacy transactions are still valid and will be confirmed.
Maybe you don't understand the scenario I'm laying out here. A legacy node(version bit 1), NOT a legacy transaction.
This node finds a SegWit address with Bitcoin and produces a transaction without a signature. This is a valid transaction on the legacy node, but when broadcast to the network, anyone running version bit 2 or above will reject the transaction for not having a valid witness.
Old nodes would also see blocks without routing data as valid. If the economic majority does not upgrade, non-compliant miners can still mine valid blocks that old nodes accept. To actually win, the routing cartel needs the economy to upgrade their wallets to produce OP_ROUTE transactions. That is effectively a hard fork from a user perspective—and users have no reason to adopt it.
And my argument is that the users would just use exchanges to transfer Bitcoin from one person to another.(another centralization pressure.)
And since the everyday user is not important or economically dense enough to matter, this would go through without a problem.
Remember, my argument is that the mining companies and the exchanges would work together in tandem because they benefit each other in this arrangement. Since the suit coiners don't care about sovereignty they'll just use the exchanges to do their financial shenanigans and all of the real Bitcoiners(who don't actually have any power) would be left out in the cold just like the BIP110 people.
I swear I could explain this much better in person. Text is not my favorite medium of expressing ideas.
They can't force everyone to run the code. Just like Segwit or Taproot. As I mentioned before, anyone can still make legacy transactions and they are valid even though effectively all the miners are running Taproot.
Also the amount of Bitcoin an entity has doesn't scale linearly with how much control they have over the network.
I am saying they can (if they have the current paradigm of majority hashpower) IGNORE all of the users who don't run the new version. Nodes who aren't corporate Miners and Exchanges don't matter. That's what we learned on Saturday. There is not enough decentralized hash power to even come close to competing with those five companies.
And again, if you don't get on board with the Cartel, you'd have to switch to Ocean (unlikely with the current events) or another protocol that uses DATUM (who?). And I don't think any of these hashing warehouses are even close to ready to do something like that.