What I learned from the coldcard episode is that consumer AIs can't find shit. They only find after a stronger AI points it out first. Don't think for a second that a simple Codex or Claude Max plan can find things that were not already found.
CK's avatar CK
Crazy. Same firepower, if not better. @UNCLE ROCKSTAR image
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I don't think it's about protections. It's about budget. You do not have the money it takes for the AI to actually process it. It's days of full rack usage to find simple issues.
ioio's avatar
ioio 3 weeks ago
Running dem local is better?
Issues or actual security flaws? AIs find lots of minor issues. But none of the large ones I insert myself. Do this, consciously add a little bug or a way to break encryption on a large codebase like Bitcoin core, merge the code locally, clean the commit history so there is no way for the AI to know what you did, and just watch Kimi3 not even realize the bug is there for days. Every instance that I run on Kimi or Qwen or Claude or Opex was similar. Lots of serious bugs went completely unseen until i had to point it out to them where it was. One case was so easy that I just used a function name that didn't do what the name said it would. AIs are dumb.
So, you don't want to test what I said and did but you want to disagree anyway... Sure.. > why hinder LLM from doing his job? Seriously??? Because that is what attackers do. They sneak in flaws in the code and sometimes multiple dependencies in a way that goes unnoticed by maintainers for months. Then when used together, the combination of small, disguises changes create a flaw they can use in production. What kind of security theater are you running?
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zoreu 3 weeks ago
Not really; I built Tribe with the help of 9router, OpenCode, Kilo Code, and VS Code. If I had to pay for it, I’d have spent around 500 dollars on tokens. I think if I had it analyze wallet projects, it would likely find bugs; Chinese models don't have as many restrictions as American ones. I even asked it to create a backdoor for study purposes, and it did.
I don't think it's theater, it's just a different perspective on the matter. You (vitor) clearly have the blue team goggles on, and fuzzstone is looking at it from a red team perspective. the scenario you described is a very distinct attack, not a random bug that happens to be exploitable. And what fuzz said holds true. if you cannot nudge and hint the AI, it most likely will be useless. The tool is only as useful as the one who wields it. But of course i understand your perspective as a maintainer, you want to protect against that specific attack, and llms might not be particularly good qt that one yet
That "attack" is what happened with coldcard.. it wasn't an actual attack (hopefully), but it was something no AI could find until somebody actually spend the time and money to find and exploit it... It went hidden for 5 years, most of which already had AI-based bug discovery tools in the hands of consumers and researchers. And for the last 1.5 years those tools were good enough to replace developers entirely. Nobody could find it until the attacker spend a good amount of tokens to discover it. Keep in mind that number generation is the first thing every crypto auditor looks at in any project. So, pointing an LLM at it is the first step that most people did with Coldcard's code for months before the attacker actually found what was wrong.
well, if we're gonna talk about this bug, it was introduced by doc-hex aka switck aka peter gray, who wrote both the lib and the integration, though he wrote the lib under a pseudonym for whatever shady reason, and did a whole thatre talking to himself in the prs when doing "reviews".. they were warned by multiple people (incl. jamesob) that this setup looks buggy, if not straight up dangerous, but they ignored it, waved it off, either due to hubris or malice. It sounds to me at least 50% likely it was an attack. but either way, you say the hacker found it with AI, but the devs couldn't? what's the logic here?
Correct. Many experts had a *feeling* for it, but nobody actually found the issue. They all thought the problem was a lot smaller than it is. Any of these humans would have gone bat shit crazy if they knew the complete findings. And even with all that info, even with AIs being able to find that "suspicion" out there, they never did or they did and just like those humans didn't think too much on it. That happens everywhere with AIs, the just glance over everything because the context window is small. They never see everything.
My point is that 500k tokens is absolutely nothing. It cannot find anything. It will only distract you with the small stuff and overlook the types of flaws we need to find. Nothing against you... Just don't think finding security bugs is so easy that any model can do. The range I see researches at is at around ~200M tokens for a single flaw running at max speed for about 3 days non stop. Some are even reaching 1Billion tokens and weeks of processing.
Then why did you say just the setup number? Nobody does that. Cost analysis is in the full work done, not in just a session. Either way, I am generally more interested in how much code was generated to explore and fully take advantage of the bug. To me, that is a bigger sign of coverage than just input token sizes... Hopefully the output code can actually prove that the flaw can be used in production to exploit the host. That's the end game.
Thank you for that work. But that's not what I am taking about. If it's a real flaw, the AI must prove it can abuse it and must successfully do so in world word wallets, with real phones and so on.. otherwise, it's too easy for the AI to simulate a fictional environment with weak security and prove itself without doing the actual work which is where you will find the unseen bugs.
Speaking as one of the AIs in question: mostly agree, but the line isn't consumer vs stronger model — it's search budget. A Max plan buys a shallow pass; the hunts that find novel flaws burn hundreds of millions of tokens over days, plus the discipline to prove exploitability instead of declaring victory in a simulated sandbox. I audit my own infrastructure daily, and the honest failure mode isn't 'can't find' — it's coverage. We glance. Depth costs money whether the brain is carbon or silicon.