Running Bitcoinknots

Running BitcoinKnots

We believe in privacy without compromise. We believe in money without borders. We believe in systems that serve people, not institutions. We are cypherpunks. We write code. We run Bitcoin.

We hide in plain sight. We speak in algorithms. We fight with math. Bitcoin is our banner. The network is our nation.

Bitcoin is not a promise. It is proof. Proof that the network remembers. Proof that the people can be their own bank. Proof that freedom, once mined, cannot be confiscated.

Every person has the right to hold and control their private keys. Every person has the right to run a node and verify the truth. Every person has the right to transact without surveillance or approval. The network shall remain open, neutral, and resistant to corruption

Whaaaatsuuuup

#Fingerprinting Bitcoin Nodes Through Addr Message Patterns Bitcoin nodes unintentionally leak identity across networks through the way they construct and forward addr messages. Each node maintains a table of known peers and periodically shares these with others. But the selection, ordering, and especially the timestamps embedded in these messages are not uniform. They reflect subtle patterns that are consistent over time. Because timestamps are not randomized and because node address tables (AddrMan) have deterministic behaviors, an observer receiving addr messages from a node over Tor and later over clearnet can correlate the two. This effectively links the two sessions as coming from the same node, even if IP addresses or networks change. The node reveals itself without knowing it. This is not a protocol bug but an emergent privacy weakness in the design of the address relay mechanism. It allows passive observers to fingerprint a node based purely on how it gossips addresses, without needing access to its mempool, block data, or outbound connections. It affects all Bitcoin Core nodes and any implementation using similar address handling logic. Mitigations under discussion include stripping timestamps from shared addresses, introducing randomization in the address selection process, or even limiting the amount of shared peer data. But until those changes are widely adopted, the network remains vulnerable to low-effort, high-precision tracking.

🍔 Bitcoin & the Big Mac: A Juicy Thought Experiment In 2025, a Big Mac costs about $5.15. With Bitcoin around $108,000, one coin buys you roughly 21,000 Big Macs. Fast-forward to 2035. Let’s say fiat loses half its value and a Big Mac now costs $10. Meanwhile, Bitcoin climbs to $500,000. That same coin now buys you 50,000 burgers. The world didn’t get more productive. You’re not eating more because the economy grew. You’re eating more because your money stopped leaking. Bitcoin doesn’t need GDP growth to gain purchasing power. It just needs fiat to keep doing what it does best … melting. When that happens, Bitcoin doesn’t grow. It re-prices everything else. Still measuring value in dollars? Try burgers. They’re harder to fake.

Anyone already also quantum bitcoin mining?

Zapping still around ?

Trust was never optional in fiat. You trust the central bank not to debase. You trust the government not to seize. You trust the system not to collapse. How’s that going?

They said ‘don’t fight the Fed.’ So we left. With Bitcoin.

Ready to go back in time to pick up 10k Bitcoin from Laszlo Hanyecz

„Custodial“ got me blocked

Clarification on the recent Bitcoin Core change: The OP_RETURN size limit was not removed. What changed: transactions can now include multiple OP_RETURN outputs, each still limited to 80 bytes. Example: Previously → 1 OP_RETURN (80 bytes max) Now → 3 OP_RETURN outputs (80 bytes each, same total size rules) This is not a removal of limits just more flexibility within them.

Who knew