GitHub flagged my new account because they say it was part of an account farming effort. The only reason for the account is to contribute to Nostr stuff like Nostrocket and NIPs as a nym. The funny thing is it operates like a shadow ban. I had no idea since I can do everything but have my work seen. Still working on it but I'm curious what sort of success and problems have been identified with Nostrified git.
OriginalSize
originalsize@nostrich.zone
npub1m6az...er28
100% alpha and stack sats. Shrinkflation-proof. Never KYC. Peace.
Intrigued by Nostrocket.org. Love the problem-focused, reality driven development approach.
My new favorite post on Nostr.


Habla
How to design perfect software - gsovereignty
None of this is set in stone. My advice is to merge more of the NIPs PRs to increase velocity of specs. Then all the proven problems will be dealt with that much faster.
Seems like a good time to consolidate utxos if you've got some piled up. #bitcoin


Corporations hold a ton of Bitcoin. What does that mean? What does self-custody look like for a corporation and how much of this is in self-custody anyway?
Much like for an individual, self-custody should mean exclusive access to spend those coins, or more exactly that only corporation-approved process could lead to valid signatures.
Government or criminal raids don't necessarily equal access to keys. For example many tech companies have a process to wipe and/or brick hardware in such emergencies.
I suppose this gets to details that wouldn't be widely known like who has access to keys. Is it a custodial service like Coinbase? Is it the c-suite? Some set of crypto-notaries? Plus how many signatures are required from how many keys?
Fundamentally, the extent to which these bitcoin treasuries are secure against government confiscation affects whether this concentration is good or bad for Bitcoin.
Much like for an individual, self-custody should mean exclusive access to spend those coins, or more exactly that only corporation-approved process could lead to valid signatures.
Government or criminal raids don't necessarily equal access to keys. For example many tech companies have a process to wipe and/or brick hardware in such emergencies.
I suppose this gets to details that wouldn't be widely known like who has access to keys. Is it a custodial service like Coinbase? Is it the c-suite? Some set of crypto-notaries? Plus how many signatures are required from how many keys?
Fundamentally, the extent to which these bitcoin treasuries are secure against government confiscation affects whether this concentration is good or bad for Bitcoin.