final [GrapheneOS] ๐Ÿ“ฑ๐Ÿ‘๏ธโ€๐Ÿ—จ๏ธ's avatar
final [GrapheneOS] ๐Ÿ“ฑ๐Ÿ‘๏ธโ€๐Ÿ—จ๏ธ
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Keeping the fight. Community Moderator for #GrapheneOS https://discuss.grapheneos.org/u/final This is a personal account. I do not speak on behalf of GrapheneOS developers as a whole (nor am I) and suggestions shall not be endorsements.
We've published an initial experimental release for the Pixel 9 Pro Fold on our staging site: Our preordered Pixel 9 Pro Fold for our device testing farm hasn't arrived yet so we'll be relying on others to test the early builds. Everything from #GrapheneOS been ported for it already and there's nothing else to do for it without testing feedback from users. There's a high chance everything is already fine for it since we have production quality support for the other 9th gen Pixels and the original 7th gen Pixel Fold.
Next release for 9th generation Pixels will have further hardening with RANDSTRUCT enabled for the kernel with a deterministic seed (the commit timestamp). RANDSTRUCT randomizes the order of data structures and function pointer tables at compilation based on a seed, so exploits need to be catered to specific seeds. We've made it deterministic to preserve #GrapheneOS reproducible builds by using the hash of the commit date as a seed so it changes the layouts with each base kernel change and we can make it per-device-model later too. When other devices get Kernel 6.1 (the upstream is in testing) it can be possible for them to get it too.
Telegram has full access to all of the content of group chats and regular one-to-one chats due to lack of end-to-end encryption. Their opt-in secret chats use homegrown end-to-end encryption with weaknesses. Deleting the content from the app likely won't remove all copies of it. Telegram has heavily participated in misinformation campaigns targeting actual private messaging apps with always enabled, properly implemented end-to-end encryption such as Signal. Should stop getting any advice from anyone who told you to use Telegram as a private messenger. Telegram is capable of handing over all messages in every group and regular one-to-one chat to authorities in France or any other country. A real private messaging app like Signal isn't capable of turning over your messages and media. Telegram/Discord aren't private platforms. A major example of how Telegram's opt-in secret chat encryption has gone seriously wrong before: The practical near term threat is for the vast majority of chats without end-to-end encryption: 100% of Telegram group chats and the regular 1-to-1 chats.
We've started work on adding support for the Pixel 9, Pixel 9 Pro and Pixel 9 Pro XL. We haven't received our test devices yet but they should arrive within a couple days. Pixel 9 Pro Fold will be supported like the earlier Pixel Fold but it's launching later than the others. #GrapheneOS on the Pixel 9 Pro Fold will be the first folding phone platform with hardware memory tagging support. The original Pixel Fold is a 7th generation device without these security features. We still need a new Pixel Tablet with ARMv9 CPU cores with MTE, PAC and BTI. They'll hopefully release one in mid-2025 when they release the Pixel 9a. Pixel 9 Pro Fold is much better than the first generation Pixel Fold. There have been major advances for the folding screen and it has been widely reviewed as being a much better device. It also has a much broader launch. Likewise, it would be great to have a tablet with MTE and 7 years of support from launch instead of 5.
It's not a surprise the #security industry is plagued with bad actors, grifters, fraudsters, and even criminals. It's easy to lie to people to follow bullshit because security and privacy are extremely easy concepts people can understand at a basic level, despite being extremely complex and requiring dedication to understand at a higher level. This is exactly the same way physical and mental health is also used to sell pseudoscience. We're in a space that attracts the fearful and paranoid, and the cold and hard truth is these types of people are easy victims because they always doubt every action they take. Anyone who can't reflect and accept their own approach will make it hard to develop an approach to stay with. It is easy to tell such people that the way they are doing things are wrong and convince them to do something else. You can reference something obscure and that is enough for some people. Pushing security nihilism that trying doesn't matter isn't helpful either. It's harmful. Giving up means you'll never have an attitude to protect. Bad actors in the security community market exactly like scammers, with: - A sense of urgency, by saying they are not safe, - An appeal to authority, referencing famous people, - Playing on their emotions, like their fear or paranoia, - Offering of scarcity or exclusivity, that everyone else is missing out or trashing other projects without valid evidence, and - Referencing current or past events, often with misinformation. Why does GrapheneOS or other open source projects go on the offensive then? Because people like these aren't competitors, they're threats. In our case, mobile security is extremely plagued with such people, selling dubious feature phones or repackaged old, insecure devices pretending they are endgame security. Some groups make apps or operating systems that don't add security benefit or reduce security. They're threats because they endanger people into believing that they are safer when they really are not. It wasn't long ago that the mobile security market had criminals that were selling dubious services bundled onto devices like EncroChat, SkyECC, Phantom Secure and more. They enabled violent criminals and likely also scammed ordinary people in the process with a false sense of security. Hundreds of thousands of people were affected by their takedowns. Companies that used to resell these now try and forget they ever had. Certain actors in the security industry also don't try and innovate security or privacy for the benefit of the world, but to benefit authoritarian regimes and a powerful, abusive elite class willing to pay them for their skills or the power they could leverage. The security industry is meant to be transparent and collaborative, with an unspoken but understood code of ethics to protect and attack to benefit business clients and users. But, some big organisations don't follow it. Forensic firms like Cellebrite sell exploits to regimes to allow data exfiltration, while mercenaries like NSO selling cyber attacks for customers to commit unlawful espionage against their political opponents and those who dissent. Oftentimes the people with money in the bank sell security and privacy to try and whitewash their past actions. For example, Unplugged is founded by Erik Prince, a war criminal and illegal arms dealer of Blackwater fame, who also employ NSO employees that sold spyware to target political opponents, journalists and dissidents. This isn't the first ex-Defence industry mobile security LARP product and it won't be the last. It is worse that these companies often steal work from open source developers (like Unplugged stealing from Element and DivestOS' Hypatia) and provide nothing in return. I will not be complacent in having such people produce their rot in the space we dedicate our daily life to. We'd rather quit than collaborate with opposition and it wouldn't have been the first time GrapheneOS had to do this.
This is a fake story: https://x.com/cryps1s/status/1824077327577591827 Turns out that getting security information from the CISO of a mass surveillance company trying to build a dystopian police state providing police with "predictive policing" software largely based on racial stereotypes is a bad move. Trail of Bits iVerify EDR product runs in the standard app sandbox on iOS and Android. It can hardly do anything beyond static scanning of APKs. It's a crippled antivirus app marketed as detecting sophisticated attackers. It's a scam and Trail of Bits has lost all credibility. Trail of Bits is working closely with Palantir and is focused on getting government contracts. They've created a fake news story to promote their EDR product which has been propagated across mainstream media. Journalists didn't do basic due diligence and spread false marketing. Verizon has a suite of low-level apps for Android devices to fully use their network. These are included on any Android device with full Verizon support. Pixels disable the packages unless a Verizon SIM is active. This is equivalent to having them installed/uninstalled on demand. One of the apps in this suite is the Showcase retail demo app for Verizon to show off phones in their store. It requires manually up the phone as a retail demo device. Verizon says they don't use it anymore. This demo app is where Trail of Bits / iVerify found an HTTP connection. In order to exploit Verizon's demo app not verifying a signature for the downloaded config or even fetching it via HTTPS, it would already need to be set up to use retail demo mode. The contractors Verizon paid to implement it did a bad job, but it's not a Pixel security issue. Since it's an obsolete app that Verizon isn't using anymore, the stock Pixel OS already removed it in Android 15 which is visible in the Android 15 Beta. The other Verizon apps needed to fully use their network which get activated with a Verizon SIM are of course still included. #GrapheneOS has been omitting these carrier apps since around 2015. This meant GrapheneOS users weren't able to use Sprint and can't use certain features on Verizon like Wi-Fi calling. Apple has a special deal with Verizon and implements what the control they want as part of iOS. The restrictions set in Verizon's carrier configuration and the functionality implemented by these apps is a major part of why they prevent installing an alternate OS on any device sold by Verizon. They want to control how people use features like tethering and Wi-Fi calling. Every month, a bunch of real vulnerabilities are patched for Android on Pixels. A subset of these including all High and Critical severity issues in Android itself get backported to older Android releases for non-Pixels too. iVerify's finding isn't even a Low severity issue. Supposedly reputable news organizations including the Washington Post, New York Times, Wired, etc. are largely acting as press release distribution service for governments and corporations. If it fits a narrative they want to tell, there's no attempt to question or confirm it. Trail of Bits employees should think over whether they want to be part of building a police state with pervasive surveillance as Palantir partners. You're not even working at a reputable security company anymore. Trail of Bits has become the charlatans they used to criticize. #security #privacy
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