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Bisq
_@bisq.network
npub1sqn6...5net
A peer-to-peer bitcoin exchange system
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bisq 0 months ago
Tired of frequent updates? We understand. Updating takes time, but keeping your software up to date is an important part of keeping your funds safe. AI tools are making it easier to discover vulnerabilities across widely used software. This increases the pressure on projects to identify and fix security issues quickly. Frequent updates are part of that response. Tor has moved to a roughly two-week release cycle to address ongoing security issues. Bisq aims to keep pace so that these fixes reach our users promptly. Even when you see few visible changes, an update can contain important security fixes. Always verify your updates. The easiest way is to use Bisq's in-app updater, which automatically verifies the download's authenticity. This helps ensure that the software you install comes from Bisq. If you download an update manually, verify it yourself before installing. Follow the verification instructions linked from our download page. Downloading a file alone does not establish its authenticity. Limit the funds you keep on your computer. Keep only what you need for active trading in your Bisq wallet. Move your savings to a secure cold-storage setup, such as a properly configured hardware wallet. Updates reduce risk. Limiting your exposure matters too.
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bisq 3 months ago
Bisq 2 v2.1.12 is available This is an important security update that fixes vulnerabilities identified during our recent security audit. Updating to this version is required to continue trading. ## Reputation Privacy and Integrity - Account-age and signed-witness reputation is bound to proven ownership and the requesting Bisq 2 profile. - Public reputation records use a nullifier and day bucket rather than raw witness identifiers and exact timestamps. - Legacy and conflicting claims receive conservative scoring. ## Bonded Roles - Bonded-role registrations identify the exact accepted proposal and lockup transaction. - Oracle-authored registrations are persisted, recovered, and revalidated against Bisq 1 DAO state. - Bonded-reputation unlock status is committed to oracle signatures. ## Bridge Reliability - Bisq 1 bridge state recovery enforces contiguous blocks, handles gaps and duplicates, and replays buffered blocks after catch-up. - RPC deadlines and fail-safe retry behavior prevent an unavailable bridge from blocking interactive services. Update from inside the Bisq app or from the Github release page:
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bisq 3 months ago
Bisq v1.10.4 is released. This important security update fixes vulnerabilities identified during our recent security audit. Updating is required to continue trading. BSQ Swaps are re-enabled. ## Release notes This is an important security update that fixes vulnerabilities identified during our recent security audit. Updating to this version is required to continue trading. BSQ Swaps have also been re-enabled. ### Security - **DAO block signatures**: DAO blocks received from the network can now be signed by trusted BSQ block providers. Bisq verifies these signatures before accepting the blocks. - **Blind-vote validation**: Bisq rejects blind votes whose encrypted payload does not match the on-chain commitment, and decrypts vote results only from the ballots that match the majority hash. - **Dispute-opening validation**: New dispute cases are validated before being accepted. Disputes that fail validation are rejected. - **Arbitrator-witness signatures**: Signed witness records are now checked for valid DSA signatures before being used for account aging. - **Seed-only data filtering**: Network data that is intended to come only from seed nodes is now rejected when received from non-seed peers. - **Price-zero offer rejection**: Offers with a price of zero are rejected and not added to the offer book. - **Burning Man fee routing**: The Burning Man distribution address list is now used when selecting BTC fee receivers. - **Trusted seeds**: Trusted seed nodes are used during network bootstrap. ### Other changes - Alert authors can remove all alerts they created. - Legacy arbitrator data has been removed from trade and deposit flows. image
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bisq 4 months ago
## Why can a decentralized exchange halt trading or temporarily deactivate features? This question comes up regularly, and it's a fair one. First, these measures are not strictly enforced. Users can opt out by starting Bisq with the `ignoreDevMsg=true` program argument. This option exists to ensure developers cannot unilaterally force restrictions on users. The purpose of these emergency mechanisms is to help prevent greater harm in exceptional situations, such as the May 1 security incident or the recent discovery of critical vulnerabilities. In those cases, temporarily disabling certain functionality is the safest way to reduce the risk of users losing funds while a fix is being prepared and deployed. ### Why not leave that decision entirely to users? The challenge is that disclosing the details of a critical vulnerability before a fix is widely available would also reveal the information needed to exploit it. That means users would have to make a decision without access to the very information that would allow them to assess the risk. In practice, this makes informed individual decision-making difficult. ### Isn't that centralized? Emergency mechanisms like this are not unique to Bisq. Bitcoin itself originally included an Alert system that allowed developers to notify users of critical issues. Once Bitcoin had matured and the ecosystem no longer depended on it, that feature was removed. Bisq is still evolving and operates in a very different environment, with a smaller user base and more rapid protocol development. At its current stage, we believe these emergency tools provide an important layer of protection against severe incidents. At the same time, users who prefer full control can opt out of these protections. That choice is respected, but it also means accepting responsibility for the additional risk. If emergency warnings or temporary safeguards are intentionally bypassed and an exploit occurs, the Bisq project cannot provide support or compensation for resulting losses.
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bisq 5 months ago
A new Bisq release (v1.10.2) is available. All users are strongly encouraged to update as soon as possible. Release highlights: • Strengthens DAO consensus validation and merit verification. • Improves precision in DAO voting and issuance calculations. • Adds protections against invalid consensus states. • Includes extensive regression testing to ensure consensus integrity and compatibility. Update directly from within Bisq or download here: image
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bisq 6 months ago
# Bisq Exploit Update 2 ## Data points We have now received all reports from affected users. The total amount of funds lost is **11.59104 BTC**. A total of **10 users** were affected. Only **altcoin trades** were impacted. **Fiat trades** are protected by the account age witness signing system, which likely acted as a deterrent to the attacker. **Three trades accounted for almost 90% of the total loss**, while **three traders suffered only very small losses**. ## What is the current status of reimbursement? No final proposal has been completed yet. Our goal remains to submit a proposal for **DAO voting**, and the current proposal period ends in about **one week**. The intent remains the same as initially communicated: **we plan to fully reimburse all victims** and provide the option to receive reimbursement in **Bitcoin or BSQ**. What remains unresolved is how to fund the reimbursement in a way that minimizes the impact on the **DAO, BSQ stakeholders, and Bisq contributors**. ## When will a new version be released? Our initial plan was to deploy a hotfix based on the latest release, with only minimal changes to address the vulnerability used in the exploit. However, this approach proved too risky. We must assume that the same attacker — and potentially others — will actively probe for additional vulnerabilities across all parts of the application. This includes the **wallet**, the **P2P network**, the **DAO**, and infrastructure components such as **external market price providers**. Given the breadth of this attack surface, a full review could not be completed in a short timeframe. We therefore focused on **hardening the trade protocol** and addressing other short-term risks that could realistically be mitigated. In addition, we decided to merge the hotfix branch into the main branch, which already contained the work for the upcoming **1.9.23 release** and was close to completion. This introduced a substantial number of additional changes and naturally requires more extensive testing — which is why this option was not initially considered. However, as the hotfix itself grew significantly in scope, the original argument no longer applied and merging became the more reasonable path. As a result, our release schedule has been delayed. We are now in the final stages and hope to begin testing and release within the next few days. We understand that this delay is frustrating for users. However, security requires discipline, and we cannot take shortcuts that could create the risk of a follow-up incident. ## What did we find during the security analysis? The main findings that could affect user funds are limited to the **trade protocol**. No new exploit path has been identified. That said, we discovered and addressed a number of potential issues. Based on our current understanding, none of them could have been used to directly steal funds. Some, however, could have caused transactions to become invalid, potentially leading to secondary damage and operational risk. ### Wallet security No wallet-related vulnerability has been identified. We are currently evaluating additional measures to further reduce wallet-related risk, but these would require significantly more time to implement. While no wallet vulnerability has been found, we cannot completely exclude the possibility that undiscovered issues may exist. Because a **hot wallet integrated into a P2P application** inherently carries more risk than a traditional wallet, we strongly recommend that users **do not keep more funds in the Bisq wallet than are necessary for active trading**. This should already be standard security practice: **keep savings in a hardware wallet, not in the Bisq wallet**. ### Other areas Our analysis of the **DAO**, **P2P network**, and **node infrastructure** did not uncover any critical vulnerabilities. However, we did address several existing issues and will continue working to reduce attack surface and strengthen protective safeguards. ## Some learnings One important lesson from this work is that **structural friction and layer boundaries can act as valuable security safeguards**. In **Bisq 1**, the maker fee transaction allocates the UTXO required by the maker for the trade. This transaction is created only through direct user action, not by network messages, and it exists outside the trade protocol itself. That separation created an important boundary and limited the maximum possible damage the exploit could cause. In the **Bisq 2 MuSig protocol**, we removed that extra transaction as an optimization. At the time, we viewed that as clear progress. With the learnings from this incident, we need to reconsider that assumption — or at minimum recognize that the protective boundary created by that separate layer no longer exists in the new protocol. **Security often works against intuition. Friction can be beneficial. Layer boundaries create risk boundaries.**
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bisq 6 months ago
**Bisq Protocol Exploit Update** This is a brief update on what we have learned so far, the current state of reimbursement planning for affected users, and some broader observations about the growing role of AI-assisted attacks. **Estimated impact** Based on preliminary estimates from data analysis and reports from affected users, the total amount stolen appears to be approximately **11 BTC**. The attacker used a **0.001 BTC** multisig output together with an unusually high **10,000 sat** miner fee in the reported transactions. That combination created a recognizable transaction fingerprint, which helped identify suspicious transactions within the time window in which the attack occurred. So far only Altcoin trades have been reported. This remains a preliminary estimate. The final amount may change as additional reports are reviewed. **How are victims getting reimbursed?** We are currently discussing several reimbursement options. Our goal is to enable **fast and complete reimbursement with minimal friction for victims**. There are, however, practical constraints: • **Protocol constraints**: victims must open arbitration cases. Arbitration can only be opened after a time lock of **10 days for altcoin trades** and **20 days for fiat trades**. • **DAO constraints**: the DAO has limits on how much can be issued per DAO cycle. • **DAO governance**: the proposal for the reimbursement has to be confirmed by the DAO via voting. The current DAO cycle will end around 25th of May. The current intention is to allow victims to choose between reimbursement in **Bitcoin** or **BSQ**. At this stage we cannot make a final commitment on the exact mechanism, but we wanted to share our intentions. For Bisq users — whether affected directly or not — discussion is ongoing in the **Matrix channel**: ( And on **GitHub**: ( The final reimbursement model will be submitted as a **DAO proposal for voting**. The exploit caused a significant challenge for both Bisq and the DAO, but we are confident it is manageable. It was serious, but it was not a fatal blow. **How did the exploit happen?** In short, the exploit was caused by a **missing validation that should have rejected negative input values provided by the taker**. The maker and taker must use the same miner fee. That fee value is provided by the taker. The attacker supplied a **negative miner fee**. When the maker calculated the multisig output amount — which includes the miner fee for the payout transaction — the negative value reduced the multisig amount to **0.001 BTC**, while the remaining funds were redirected to the taker’s change output. Unfortunately, the taker change output was a leftover from older protocol versions. It had already been identified as something that should be removed, but that cleanup had unfortunately not happened. **Was it an AI-assisted attack?** We cannot answer that with certainty. However, based on our own experience during the investigation, we think it is likely. After the issue was discovered, one group of developers started manual code inspection to understand how the exploit could have happened. A second group used AI-assisted analysis. The AI-assisted group was faster and identified the exploit path in a relatively short time. The first AI-generated attempt turned out to be a false positive, but a second attempt by another developer successfully reproduced the exploit. It also produced both an attack patch and a corresponding fix. AI tools include safeguards, so simply asking them to identify an exploit will usually not work. However, with enough context, careful prompting, and a degree of social engineering of the model, those safeguards can be bypassed. Based on our experience, it is reasonable to assume that the attacker may have followed a similar path. **A warning shot** Some Bisq developers are highly proficient with AI tools. However, we had not systematically used them as part of an actual security audit process. One developer attempted to get Bisq into an external security audit program, but the application was rejected. In hindsight, this was a serious failure on our side. The mistake was not only the missing validation check. It was also failing to react early enough to the changing security landscape and the increasing practical relevance of AI-assisted vulnerability discovery. We must assume that there will be further attempts. Over the coming weeks we will invest significant effort into hardening the codebase and actively using AI tools ourselves to search for failure modes. We are particularly focused on vulnerabilities that could directly affect the wallet. Until additional review and hardening are completed, we recommend that Bisq users **do not keep more BTC in their Bisq wallet than is necessary for active trading**. We also hope this serves as a useful warning to other projects in the space. If our experience helps others identify similar risks earlier and strengthen their defenses, something positive may still come out of it. **Release plans** We have already fixed the immediate vulnerability and are currently working on additional hardening for a hotfix release. We expect to publish that release in the coming days. After that, we will continue with a follow-up release focused on further hardening, broader review, and additional security auditing.
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